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A B ST R ACT. Intellectual property law was once an arcane subject. Today it is at the center of
some of the most highly charged political contests of our time. In recent years, college students,
subsistence farmers, AIDS activists, genomic scientists, and free-software programmers have
mobilized to challenge the contours of intellectual property (IP) law. Very recently, some from
these groups have begun to develop a shared critique under the umbrella of "access to
knowledge" (A2K). Existing accounts of the political economy of the field of IP have suggested
that such a mobilization was unlikely. This Article takes the emergence of the A2K mobilization
as an opportunity to develop a richer and less deterministic account of the contemporary politics
of IP. It draws upon "frame mobilization" literature, which illuminates the role that acts of
interpretation play in instigating, promoting, and legitimating collective action. The frame-
analytic perspective teaches that before a group can act it must develop an account of its interests
and theorize how to advance these interests. These acts of interpretation are both socially
mediated and contingent. Ideas can be a resource for those engaged in mobilization, but one that
is not fully in their control. Frames thus can lay the scaffolding for a countermovement even as
they pave the way for a movement's success. Law is a key location for framing conflicts because it
provides groups with symbolic resources for framing, and because groups struggle within the
field of law to gain control over law's normative and instrumental benefits. Law thus exerts a
gravitational pull on framing processes. Engagement with law can influence a group's
architecture, discourse, and strategies, and can also create areas of overlapping agreement and-
as importantly-a language of common disagreement between opposing groups. The Article
closes by suggesting some implications of this point, which should be of interest to those who
design legal institutions and who engage in social mobilization. Most intriguing, perhaps, is the
role it suggests that law may play in the creation of global publics and polities.
A UT H OR. This Article has benefited greatly from the suggestions of more readers than I can
thank here. I owe a special debt of gratitude to my colleagues at U.C. Berkeley School of Law and
Yale Law School, and particularly to Professors Catherine Albiston, Jack Balkin, James Boyle,
Yochai Benkler, Lauren Edelman, Terry Fisher, Oona Hathaway, David Lieberman, Peter
Menell, Robert Merges, Robert Post, Carol Rose, Pamela Samuelson, Reva Siegel, and Molly S.
Van Houweling. I note, finally, that I have engaged in advocacy work around access-to-
medicines issues in connection with some of the groups discussed herein. All views expressed
here are, of course, my own.
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INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property law was, until recently, an arcane subject. Over the last
decade or so, however, that has begun to change. College students in the
United States have formed organizations to challenge the scope of copyright
law. AIDS activists have provoked arrest to challenge laws about drug patents.
Computer programmers have led street demonstrations and lobbying
campaigns against software patents. Farmers in developing countries have
protested in the hundreds of thousands against seed patents and the licensing
practices of multinational seed companies. Whether their object is generic
drugs or a free genome, free software or free culture, a disparate collection of
groups is thematizing new conflicts between property in knowledge and
human efforts to create, develop, communicate, and share knowledge in our
increasingly informational society.
Very recently, some from these groups have begun to seek to affiliate and
make common cause under the rubric of "access to knowledge" (A2K). This
has occurred most notably through a recent campaign to press the World
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to adopt a "development agenda."
Advocacy groups from North and South joined forces to support this call,
demanding that the agency become more receptive to the needs of developing
countries and more open to mechanisms of innovation that do not rely on
exclusive rights. WIPO agreed to consider the shift, and advocates made use of
the political opening to draft a model Access to Knowledge Treaty.' This treaty
is less a completed proposal than a protean campaign platform. Its central aims
are to embed a set of users' rights in information at the international level and
to create international mechanisms to protect and sustain open models of
innovation.
As they formulate these demands and work together, those involved are
also seeking to develop a shared identity and a common critique of the existing
intellectual property system. This "AK mobilization"2 has had some notable
1. Treaty on Access to Knowledge (May 9, 2005) (draft), http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k
_treaty-may9.pdf [hereinafter AK Treaty].
2. I use the term "social mobilization" instead of "social movement" to avoid the confusion
generated by the different views that scholars have about the proper definition of a "social
movement." Definitions of social movements vary substantially across the sociological
literature. Speaking broadly, "most are based on three or more of the following axes:
collective or joint action; change-oriented goals or claims; some extra- or noninstitutional
collective action; some degree of organization; and some degree of temporal continuity."
Davis A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter Kriesi, Mapping the Terrain, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 3, 6 (David A. Snow, Sarah A. Soule & Hanspeter
Kriesi eds., 2004). Some scholars emphasize the importance of disruptive acts of political
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successes. Access-to-medicines campaigners secured the first ever amendment
to a core World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement, in this case the Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement. They also helped
to bring down the prices of AIDS medicines in developing countries by more
than ninety-five percent, embed significant procedural protections and
substantive limits in the new Indian Patent Act (and thereby potentially affect
the prices of medicines globally as well as in India), and persuade the World
Health Organization (WHO) to consider proposals for new international
mechanisms to better align medical research and development (R&D) with
protest and urge a definition of social movements that distinguishes them sharply from
interest groups. See, e.g., Frances Fox Piven & Richard A. Cloward, Normalizing Collective
Protest, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY 301 (Aldon D. Morris & Carol McClurg
Mueller eds., 1992); see also Snow et al., supra, at 7-8 (arguing that interest groups and social
movements overlap, but are "positioned differently in relation to the polity or state"). But see
Paul Burstein, Social Movements and Public Policy, in How SOCIAL MOVEMENTS MATTER 3
(Marco Giugui, Doug McAdam & Charles Tilly eds., 1999) (questioning the value of
distinguishing between interest groups and social movements). For others, the key element
of a social movement is "the mobilization of previously unorganized or non-political
challengers." See DOUG MCADAM, POLITICAL PROCESS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF BLACK
INSURGENCY, 1930-1970, at xxv (2d ed. 1999). Sometimes the term social movement is used
to designate "popular" as opposed to "elite" contention. Id. at xxxi (emphasis omitted). Still
others have defined social movements as groups that act in the cultural and social realm, but
that do not make claims on the state through traditional political means. See Eduardo Canel,
New Social Movement Theory and Resource Mobilization Theory: The Need for Integration, in
COMMUNITY POWER AND GRAsSROOTS DEMOCRACY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF SOCIAL LIFE
189, 196 (Michael Kaufman & Haroldo Dilla Alfonso eds., 1997) (describing the arguments
of "new social movement" theorists). Today, the term is subject to so many competing
definitions that it arguably sheds less light than heat. See Michael McCann, Law and Social
Movements: Contemporary Perspectives, 2 ANN. REv. L. & Soc. ScI. 17, 23 (2006) (noting that
"several leading scholars [have] abandon[ed] the concept for the broader, more inclusive
label of contentious politics"). Some AK participants look like more traditional social
movement actors (for example, AIDS activist groups), while others look like elite actors or
interest groups (for example, businesses engaged in open-source projects, D.C.-based
NGOs). Developing-country governments themselves have played a significant role in the
•A2K mobilization, as will become clear. Nothing in the Article that follows turns on whether
the A2K mobilization meets one or another definition of a social movement. I therefore use
the term "social mobilization," which is intended to focus attention on acts of claiming and
struggle in the political arena, rather than on particular institutional or organizational forms.
The Article will at times, to avoid monotony, use the term "movement" and "coalition"
interchangeably with "mobilization," but throughout what is intended is a reference to the
broader concept of political action and claims making. The term "transnational advocacy
network" might also be appropriate to describe the A2K mobilization. I do not adopt it here
because it tends to be identified predominantly with professionalized NGO advocacy (which
is a part, but not the whole, of the A2K mobilization), and because the term has evolved
more in relation to political science literature than to the social movement literature central
to my inquiry here. See MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND
BORDERS: ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1998).
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global health needs. Free-software programmers, supported by major
corporations with investments in open-source software models, helped prevent
the passage of a directive that would have codified the availability of a broad
range of software patents in the European Union. The private ordering
schemes introduced by proponents of free software and "copyleft" licenses have
proliferated rapidly. Free software is well integrated into the IT industries, and
Creative Commons copyright licenses govern more than sixty million works
around the world today.
Significant changes are also underway at WIPO. The development agenda
process has led to institutional changes within the agency, such as the creation
of a new standing committee on IP and development, and has been credited
with derailing the negotiation of a Substantive Patent Law Treaty -an effort
that has been a high priority for the United States and European Union. In the
United States, the Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly intervened to
diminish the strength of patent rights, though just how substantially is not yet
clear. The U.S. Congress is seriously considering patent reform that would
have the same effect. These signs suggest that the tide of expansion in IP law
that has characterized the past thirty years may be slowing, and in some areas,
even ebbing.
All of this ought to be somewhat surprising. The public choice accounts
developed in IP scholarship to explain the strengthening of IP law over the last
thirty years suggest that such a countermobilization is highly unlikely, or even
impossible.' How, then, can we account for the new A2K mobilization and its
apparent successes?
This Article addresses this question, and in doing so contributes to two
fields that are rarely if ever discussed together: IP scholarship and law-and-
social-movements scholarship. The Article has several aims. First, it offers an
account of the A2K mobilization and shows why this new mobilization should
lead us to supplement existing theories of the political economy of IP law with
theories that can elucidate the mediating role of interpretation in political
mobilization. Second, it demonstrates the importance of what sociologists call
"framing processes" to the dynamics that are shaping this area of law and the
sometimes perverse effects that these processes have on both A2K activists and
those who oppose them. Third, it uses the A2K case study to illustrate the
"gravitational" pull that law can exert on framing processes and to hypothesize
some of the kinds of effects that this force can exert on those engaged in
mobilization.
3. See infra Part II.
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To fully describe, understand, and ultimately intervene in IP law today, we
must, I contend, turn to the literature on "frame mobilization" that has
developed in the discipline of sociology. This literature investigates how social
actors engage the field of ideas to theorize their interests, build alliances,
mobilize support, and discredit their opponents. Using framing theory, we can
see that recent flux in IP law has been filtered and organized by conceptual
frames in ways that are nontrivial. Frames affect what the players understand
to be their interests, whom they believe to be their allies, and how they justify
the change they seek. These frames direct as well as reflect material
circumstances, and as a result, the domain of the political cannot be
mathematically reduced to the domain of the material.
Many of those who offer public choice explanations of the state of IP law in
fact acknowledge this. My contribution is not to introduce the notion that acts
of interpretation matter to the field of IP, but to offer a theoretical paradigm
that permits us to systematize and extend this insight, and to relate it formally
to existing public choice accounts of the politics of IP. Framing theory helps us
see how groups engage in socially mediated acts of interpretation to theorize
their interests and the ways these interests can be realized.
Importantly, the imperative of interpretation applies not only to those
engaged in social movements, but also to actors in more rationalized
institutional contexts, including in the domain of business. This Article thus
applies framing theory not only to the A2K mobilization, but also to the
mobilization of industry that preceded it. It is unusual to use the tools of
framing theory to understand collective action in the corporate domain,
perhaps because businesses are often excluded by definition from the social
movement literature. But corporate actors also need accounts of their interests
and theories of how to advance them, as the frame-analytic perspective helps to
show.
Framing theory also illuminates the paradoxical effects that interpretive
processes can have on groups engaged in framing contests. By examining the
evolution of the A2K mobilization, we can see concretely how engagement with
law can bring actors locked in a struggle over law into alignment with one
another. This illustrates the "gravitational" pull that law can exert over framing
processes. Law can exert this power because it is a key location for normative
and symbolic meaning making, and because it links norms and language to
force in a manner that is somewhat - but not fully - permeable to the claims of
social actors. Law thus holds out the possibility that those who speak in its
terms can translate their ideas and interpretations into concrete change. But it
also has a historical and institutional weight, one that exerts a pull on those
who operate within its field. Using the A2K mobilization as a case study, we
can begin to identify different kinds of effects that law can have on framing
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processes, including what I call "architectural," "discursive," and "strategic"
effects. Building on these examples, the Article explicates some of the possible
implications of law's gravitational pull. Engagement with law can, I contend,
have an integrative effect on social actors, creating areas of overlapping
agreement and-as importantly-a language of common disagreement
between opposing groups. "Disagreement" here means something very
specific: the circumstance where "interlocutors both understand and do not
understand the same thing by the same words."4
The Article closes by theorizing some of the implications of this point. The
integrative effect that engagement with law can have will be of interest to those
who design legal institutions because it suggests that social actors struggling
over the terms of law can end up strengthening and legitimating law in the
process. It should also be of interest to those who engage in social mobilization
because it suggests that engagement with law can change the language and
aims of a movement, bringing it into outward alignment with its opponents.
This may be undesirable from a movement's perspective, although it is
important to note that the Article neither presumes nor seeks to demonstrate
that movement actors should invariably wish to resist law's gravitational pull.
If those involved in the A2K mobilization do, however, the frame-analytic
perspective suggests several possible strategies, which are described below.
Lastly, if law helps bring competing groups into areas of agreement as well as
common disagreement, then international and transnational law may be part of
the answer to the question of how political discourse moves beyond the
borders of the nation state. Analyzing the A2K mobilization thus can help us
begin to theorize the relationship between law and the creation of global
publics and polities.
Part I offers a brief introduction to sociological framing theory and situates
this theory in relation to alternative theories of social movements and collective
action. It also describes recent attempts to incorporate law into theories of
framing. Part II demonstrates the power of framing theory to elucidate the
dynamics of mobilization among IP industries and A2K actors. It shows why
we need theories of the role of interpretation in political action, and not public
choice theory alone, to account for the rapidly fluctuating politics of the field of
IP. Part III articulates the effects of law on the A2K mobilization, elucidating
the gravitational pull that law can exert on framing processes and some of its
possible implications.
4. JACQUES RANcItRE, DISAGREEMENT, atxi (Julie Rose trans., 1999).
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I. COLLECTIVE ACTION AND FRAME MOBILIZATION
In 1965, Mancur Olson intervened in discussions of politics and collective
action with a simple, even elegant, argument: rational people with interests in
common will, in many instances, be unwilling to act with others to advance
these common interests.' His hypothesis drew upon the behavioral
assumptions of rational choice theory,6 and on theories of the dysfunctions of
collective action developed in the study of markets, such as the "free rider"
problem. One of Olson's main conclusions was that large collectivities with
diffuse interests will be systematically disadvantaged in the political process as
compared to smaller groups with more acute interests because larger groups
face higher organizing costs and are affected more severely by incentives to free
ride.7 These insights were the foundation for public choice theory, which
applies economic analysis to politics and treats "the legislative process as a
microeconomic system in which 'actual political choices are determined by the
efforts of individuals and groups to further their own interests.'
8
Around the same time, sociologists and political scientists began to develop
new theories of social movements to engage a parallel set of questions about
collective action. They shared with Olson the premise that collective action was
a puzzle, and they positioned themselves against previous theories that tended
5. See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965).
6. Olson's theory, that is, presumes that humans are by their nature self-interested and act
purposively to advance their interests. The definition of "interest" that Olson intends,
however, is more obscure. On the one hand, he insists that his theory applies "whenever
there are rational individuals interested in a common goal," and not only to "monetary or
material" interests. Id. at 159. But he also notes that it is not "especially useful" to define
everything that humans do, including giving money to a charity, as being in their individual
self-interest, because this definition is tautological. Id. at 16o n.91. He therefore concedes
that his theory is "not at all sufficient where philanthropic lobbies" or groups that work for
"lost causes" are concerned. Id. at 16o-61. This presents a dilemma that persists in public
choice theory. If "interests" are not defined only as material and monetary interests, but
cannot be permitted to encompass things such as "feeling[s] of personal moral worth," id. at
16o n.91, where does one draw the definitional line? Public choice theory loses its parsimony
and tractability if its definition of "interest" is untethered from the material domain. For
that reason, this Article will treat interests in public choice theory as referring to material
interests alone. For further discussion of interest definition in public choice theory, see infra
Section II.B. See also Myra Marx Ferree, The Political Context of Rationality: Rational Choice
Theory and Resource Mobilization, in FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY, supra note 2,
at 29 (discussing these issues in relation to resource mobilization theory, which draws
heavily on Olson's work).
7. OLSON, supra note 5, at 46-48, 165-67.
8. DANIEL A. FARBER& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 14-15 (1991).
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to treat "the passage from a condition of exploitation or frustration to collective
action aimed at reversing the condition [as] a simple, direct, and unmediated
process."9 They instead began from the recognition that "collective actors come
and go. Some show up when not anticipated. Others fail to mobilize and press
their claims, even when they appear to have a natural constituency. And those
that do show up vary considerably in how successful they are.""0 Like public
choice theorists, social-movement theorists began to try to explain why social
mobilization does not follow directly or predictably from the existence of
individual or collective disparities.
Three dominant schools of social movement theory emerged in sociology.
The first two were the "resource mobilization" and "political process"
traditions, which focused attention on the role of internal and external
resources in facilitating collective action.1 Then, in the late i98os, in line with
"the broader 'cultural turn' in the social sciences," scholars began to attend
more closely to the influence of structures of meaning on political action. 2 The
result was the "frame-analytic" perspective, which focuses on the role of
9. Canel, supra note 2, at 189, 19o; see also John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald, Resource
Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: PERSPECTIVES
AND ISSUES 149, 150 (Steven M. Buechler & F. Kurt Cylke, Jr., eds., 1997) (cataloguing "[a]
number of studies [that] have shown little or no support for expected relationships between
objective or subjective deprivation and the outbreak of movement phenomena and
willingness to participate in collective action"); Mayer N. Zald, Looking Backwards To Look
Forward: Reflections on the Past and Future of the Resource Mobilization Research Program, in
FRONTIERS IN SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY, supra note 2, at 326, 328 (noting that earlier
approaches to social movements "all more or less assumed an increase in grievances as the
major engine of social movements").
lo. David A. Snow et al., Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement
Participation, 51 AM. Soc. REv. 464, 478 (1986) [hereinafter Snow et al., Micromobilization] ;
see also David A. Snow, Framing Processes, Ideology, and Discursive Fields, in THE BLACKWELL
COMPANION TO SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, supra note 2, at 380, 382 [hereinafter Snow, Discursive
Fields] ("History is replete with examples of aggregations of individuals who are deprived
relative to their neighbors, who are exploited economically, or who are objects of
stigmatization and differential treatment, but who have not mobilized in order to
collectively challenge the appropriate authorities regarding their situation.").
ii. For an elaboration of resource mobilization theory, see J. Craig Jenkins, Resource
Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements, 9 ANN. REV. SOC. 527 (1983);
McCarthy & Zald, supra note 9; and Zald, supra note 9. For an explanation of the political
process model, see SIDNEY TARROw, POWER IN MOVEMENT: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND
CONTENTIOUS POLITICS (2d ed. 1998); and David S. Meyer, Protest and Political
Opportunities, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 125, 127-28 (2004).
12. Nicholas Pedriana, From Protective to Equal Treatment: Legal Framing Processes and
Transformation of the Women's Movement in the 196os, 111 AM. J. Soc. 1718, 1720 (2006).
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interpretation in social mobilization.'3 Proponents of frame mobilization theory
urged attention to the "fact that grievances or discontents are subject to
differential interpretation, and the fact that variations in their interpretation
across individuals, social-movement organizations, and time can affect whether
and how they are acted upon."' 4 Drawing on the work of theorists such as
Erving Goffman, they sought to build a new account based on the "readily
documentable observation that both individual and corporate actors often
misunderstand or experience considerable doubt and confusion about what it
is that is going on and why.""5
Framing theory emerged out of the recognition that one cannot organize in
concert with others to alter a set of material conditions without an
interpretation of one's interests or grievances and theories of how to advance
them. A key task of movement actors, then, is "produc[ing] and maint[aining]
... meaning for constituents, antagonists, and bystanders or observers."' 6
Such acts of "meaning construction" have been termed "framing,"17 drawing
on Goffman's definition of a "frame" as a "schemata of interpretation" that
allows people to "locate, perceive, identify, and label" experiences and events. 8
Frames can be distinguished from ideologies in their degree of particularity and
in their orientation toward action.' 9 Framing theory, in turn, calls attention to
13. Snow et al., Micromobilization, supra note lo, at 465. For a description of framing theory
written by two of its progenitors, see Robert D. Benford & David A. Snow, Framing Processes
and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment, 26 ANN. REV. Soc. 611, 614 (2000).
14. Snow et al., Micromobilization, supra note io, at 465.
15. Id. at 466. Although it is beyond the scope of this paper, it is worth noting that empirical
and theoretical work in the field of cognitive linguistics has led scholars in that field to
conclude that cognitive frames play a central role in human understanding and political
discourse. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF, MORAL POLITICS (2d ed. 2002); GEORGE LAKOFF,
WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS (1987).
16. Benford & Snow, supra note 13, at 613.
17. Id. at 614.
,8. ERVING GOFFMAN, FRAME ANALYSIS: AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE 21
(1974).
1g. Mayer N. Zald, Culture, Ideology, and Strategic Framing, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 261, 262 (Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy & Mayer N. Zald eds.,
1996); see also David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Clarifying the Relationship Between
Framing and Ideology, in FRAMES OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE FRAMING
PERSPECTIVE 205, 209 (Hank Johnston & John A. Noakes eds., 2005) ("[F]rom a framing
perspective, ideologies constitute cultural resources that can be tapped and exploited for the
purpose of constructing collective action frames and thus function simultaneously to
facilitate and constrain framing processes."); Snow, Discursive Fields, supra note io, at 397
(characterizing the concept of ideology as more blunt, mechanistic, and totalizing than the
concept of frame mobilization); Zald, supra, at 262 (" [I]deology is the set of beliefs that are
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the signifying work that collective actors undertake and avoids the more static
and totalizing models often associated with the concept of ideology.2"
An example can illustrate the initial premise of framing theory: a poor
person who is asked to pay ten times his daily wage for a medicine could come
to many different conclusions using many different frames. He might decide
that his wages are too low (a workers' rights frame), that the price of medicine
is too high (a consumers' rights frame), that God is angry with him (a religious
punishment frame), or that the price is the unavoidable result of the expense of
medical innovation (a market-innovation frame).21 Each frame is socially
mediated, which is to say, each act of framing represents a process of
interpretation that takes place between rather than strictly within individuals.
Each also implies a different form of action and different potential allies and
opponents.
Whether a particular frame is adopted, or successful, is likely to depend on
contextual factors that vary across space and time. Frames are not fashioned
out of whole cloth by individuals; like language itself, frames are essentially
social in nature. They draw on (and contribute to) the existing "cultural stock"
of ideas and images. 2 In order to succeed, frames must resonate with their
intended audience.23 The key insight of framing theory, then, is that the
existence and success of collective action is affected not only by political and
material resources, but also by the ability of social actors to frame problems
and solutions in particular ways and to "align" their frames with those used by
potential adherents and bystanders.
used to justify or challenge a given social-political order and are used to interpret the
political world; frames are the specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive
cues used to render or cast behavior and events in an evaluative mode and to suggest
alternative modes of action.").
2o. See Snow & Benford, supra note 19, at 206. Framing processes are arguably also easier to
analyze empirically than theories of ideology. See id. at 210; see also Myra Marx Ferree,
Resonance and Radicalism: Feminist Framing in the Abortion Debates of the United States and
Germany, lo9 AM. J. Soc. 304, 308 (2003) ("The concept of a frame as an 'interpretive
package' with an internal structure organized around a central idea provides a unit of
analysis to track over time and in specific contests over meaning.").
21. These do not, of course, exhaust the possibilities, and an individual could hold several of
these beliefs at once. As Goffman argued, "during any one moment of activity, an individual
is likely to apply several frameworks." GOFFMAN, supra note 18, at 25.
22. Zald, supra note 19, at 266. Zald offers the example of the feminist claim that "'[a] woman's
body is her own,"' which "makes sense only in a cultural discourse that highlights notions of
individual autonomy and equality of citizenship rights." Id. at 266-67.
23. See David A. Snow & Robert D. Benford, Master Frames and Cycles of Protest, in FRONTIERS
IN SociAL MOvEMENT THEORY, supra note 2, at 133, 141 (hypothesizing various determinants
of the potency and resonance of particular frames).
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The framing perspective is intended not to deny that material resources or
political opportunity structures matter to the success of a mobilization, but to
account for how groups inspire and legitimate action, and how they come to
view some actions and events as more or less desirable, risky, or costly.' Those
who adopt a frame-analytic perspective seek to integrate considerations of
meaning into structural and material accounts by treating meaning as another
factor that reflects and shapes the availability of resources and external
opportunity structures.2"
Framing theorists have proposed a typology of framing processes that
social actors use to garner support and build a sense of their collective
interests. 6 They have also identified three "core framing tasks" that are central
to successful collective action: diagnosis (identifying a problem and attributing
causes or blame), prognosis (suggesting a means to resolve the problem and
allocating responsibility for action), and motivation (calling upon others to act
against the problem). 7 Framing theory thus helps us see that all collectivities
face not one but many interpretive tasks. They must, at a minimum, develop a
theory of their joint interests, determine how these interests can be advanced,
and articulate these interests in a way that garners support.
The framing literature has grown rapidly since its inception. 8 Recently,
frame-analytic perspectives also have been applied to the emergence of
transnational social movements.2 9 As framing theory has evolved, it has also
been challenged and revised. Early framing theory adopted a largely
instrumental conception of frames, tending to describe them as external to
social actors and relations."0 More recently, critics have stressed that acts of
framing cannot be understood as entirely externalized or volitional. This is
because "[clultural practices do not have the same 'thingness' that lends to
their acquisition, exclusivity of control and dispersion that material resources
have."3" As critics have pointed out, acts of framing are necessarily "dialogical";
24. Id. at 151-52.
25. See Benford & Snow, supra note 13, at 631.
z6. These include "frame bridging," "frame amplification," "frame extension," and "frame
transformation." Snow et al., Micromobilization, supra note lo, at 467, 469, 472, 473.
27. Benford & Snow, supra note 13, at 615.
28. Id. at 612; see also Pedriana, supra note 12, at 1721 n.3 ("[F]raming has arguably emerged as
the central cultural perspective on social movements.").
29. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 2, at 2-3, 17; SIDNEY TARROw, THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL
ACTIVISM 59-76 (2005).
30. See, e.g., Benford & Snow, supra note 13, at 613.
31. Marc W. Steinberg, Toward a More Dialogic Analysis of Social Movement Culture, in SOCIAL
MOVEMENTS: IDENTITY, CULTURE, AND THE STATE 208, 210 (David S. Meyer, Nancy
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groups "create oppositional discourses by borrowing from the discourses of
those they oppose," engaging in a "tug of meanings in ongoing dialogue [that]
can have unanticipated, and sometimes contradictory, consequences for
movement development."32 Frames also have a "discursive" quality, "limit[ing]
what can be discussed or heard in a political context," and as such should be
understood not only to enable but also to delimit action.33 It is this dialogical
and discursive concept of framing that this Article invokes.
Only recently have sociologists begun to address the specific role that law
plays in framing processes.34 Scholars in the law and society tradition have
addressed questions of how courts affect and are affected by social change, and
of the impact of cause lawyering on social movements." But they have not
generally engaged the theory of frame mobilization, with the result that "law
has not ... been systematically incorporated-as a fundamental concept and
theoretical mechanism-into social movement theory generally, and into the
cultural framing perspective specifically."
36
Whittier & Belinda Robnett eds., 2002). Snow and Benford embrace this dialogic
understanding, emphasizing that the essence of framing processes "resides 'not within us,
but between us."' Snow & Benford, supra note 19, at 207 (citation omitted).
32. Steinberg, supra note 31, at 208.
33. Nancy A. Naples, The "New Consensus" on the Gendered "Social Contract": The 1987-1988 U.S.
Congressional Hearings on Welfare Reform, 22 SIGNS 907, 908 n.3 (1997). Conceived of in this
way, framing theory shares more with Gramscian theories of ideology, but in my view
retains important differences in emphasis. Even more dialogic forms of framing theory are
centered on the agency that individuals exercise in the exercise of speech and thought.
Because of this, and because framing theorists view the world as made up of innumerable
overlapping frames more than a few more totalizing ideologies, they are better situated to
describe what Touraine calls the "complex of social relations and movement, cultural
products and political struggles" that characterize the contemporary world. ALAIN
TOURAINE, THE VOICE AND THE EYE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS S (i981); see also
supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
34. Pedriana, supra note 12, at 1721-22 ("[L]aw and legal institutions have not been central
components of social movement theory generally, nor of cultural framing scholarship
specifically."). This is likely in part because at least some early theorists understood social
movements as entities that do not engage with law. See supra note 2.
35. Pedriana, supra note 12, at 1722 n.4; see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL
RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004); MICHAEL
W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK (1994); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOw HOPE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); STUART A. SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF
RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL CHANGE (1974); Paul Burstein, Legal
Mobilization as a Social Movement Tactic: The Struggle for Equal Employment Opportunity, 96
AM.J. Soc. 1201 (1991).
36. Pedriana, supra note 12, at 1723; see also Michael W. McCann, How Does Law Matter for Social
Movements?, in How DOES LAW MATTER? 76, 78 (Bryant G. Garth & Austin Sarat eds., 1998)
("Just how law matters rarely is addressed in any sustained, theoretically rigorous way by
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Recent work has sought to remedy this and to theorize the special role of
law in frame mobilization." Nicholas Pedriana, for example, makes the case
that law and legal symbols serve as "master frames" for social movements, 8
which is to say, as powerful and broad "master algorithm[s]"3 9 that "resonate
deeply across social movements and protest cycles," 4' and that have
"potentially dominant" effects." The explanation for this, Pedriana argues, lies
partially in the modern "legalization of society" (a phenomenon that, as de
Tocqueville noted, has been particularly profound in the United States) .42 But
it lies also in the inherent qualities of law as a "dual resource" for movement
actors, one that encompasses both "instrumental incentives and penalties, on
the one hand, and socially constructed legitimating scripts and schemas, on the
other."43 On this account, law is attractive to movements because it is both a
"means by which a movement can ... garner legitimacy and support for the
movement" and "the ends of that process."'
Political scientist Michael McCann has also recently sought to elaborate and
categorize the various ways that law influences the frames and processes of
[social movement] literature."). Keck and Sikkink's foundational account of transnational
issue networks also does not address the role of law in the mobilization of such networks.
This is striking, because there is a notable correspondence between international law and the
two issues that they define as "most characteristic of [transnational advocacy] networks,"
those of "bodily harm" (for example, torture) and "legal equality of opportunity." KECK &
SIKKINK, supra note 2, at 204.
37. Pedriana, supra note 12, at 1720. Other recent articles that theorize the role of law in frame
mobilization include Ferree, supra note 20; Valerie Jenness, Managing Differences and Making
Legislation: Social Movements and the Racialization, Sexualization, and Gendering of Federal
Hate Crime Law in the U.S., 1985-1998, 46 Soc. PROBS. 548 (1999); and Anna-Maria
Marshall, Injustice Frames, Legality, and the Everyday Construction of Sexual Harassment, 28
LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 659 (2003).
38. Pedriana, supra note 12, at 1725.
39. Benford & Snow, supra note 13, at 618.
40. Pedriana, supra note 12, at 1725.
41. Id. at 1751. As Snow and Benford define them, "Master frames are generic; specific collective
action frames are derivative. So conceived, master frames can be construed as functioning in
a manner analogous to linguistic codes in that they provide a grammar that punctuates and
syntactically connects patterns or happenings in the world." Snow & Benford, supra note 23,
at 138. Two examples of "master frames" that Snow and Benford offer are the
"psychosalvational frame" (used, for example, by spiritual movements of self-realization)
and the "civil rights frame" (which, as they invoke it, attributes blame for unjust
circumstances to "encrusted, discriminatory structural arrangements rather than to the
victim's imperfections"). Id. at 139.
42. Pedriana, supra note 12, at 1726.
43. Id. at 1727.
44. Id. at 1729.
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social movements. McCann emphasizes the fact that "law provides both
normative principles and strategic resources for the conduct of social
struggle,"4 and seeks to build a dynamic model that identifies particular
moments of legal influence on movements. Law can, in his view, be a resource
for groups seeking to "name and to challenge existing social wrongs or
injustices, '', 6 provide practical "leverage" and "symbolic normative power, '47
and influence a movement's "overall 'opportunity structure.""' By the same
token, "law can constrain opportunities when legal norms are biased against
certain types of claims. '49 Law thus "can at once both empower and
disempower variously situated social groups. '0
Legal scholars interested in questions of social change until recently paid
little attention to the relationship between law and the frames used by social
movements."' There are some notable exceptions, who do not explicitly invoke
the literature on framing, but who seek to illuminate the complex relationship
between law's meanings and social-movement mobilization. William Forbath's
work on the evolution of the American labor movement is one such example.
He recounts the history of the interaction between the U.S. labor movement
and courts, making the case that resistance and hostility from judges led the
labor movement to realign its goals away from a radical republicanism and
toward a more modest attempt to secure workers' basic freedom to organize.52
45. McCann, sup
46. McCann, sup




ra note 2, at 22.
ra note 36, at 83.
Id. at 84.
Id. at88.
Id. at 82. For a more comprehensive elaboration of some of these themes, see generally
MCCANN, supra note 35. Both Pedriana and McCann invoke a capacious definition of "law,"
understanding it not just as a set of institutions and rules, but also as a set of concepts and
symbolic effects that are immanent to such institutions and rules, such as the "conceptual
prisms of property, contract, rights, obligations, [and] due process." Pedriana, supra note 12,
at 1723; see also McCann, supra note 36, at 81. Lawyers and legal scholars might ightly note
that there is no one legal "prism" of property or contract or tights. But the existence of
multiple and competing legal narratives about, for example, the nature of property does not
contradict the argument that legal discourses about property influence social conceptions of
property. It simply suggests that these influences are multiple and may, at times, compete
with one another.
McCann, supra note 36, at 77.
William E. Forbath, The Shaping of the American Labor Movement, 102 HARv. L. REv. 11o9,
1132-79 (1989).
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Over time, he seeks to show, organizers came to inhabit a language that they
had adopted strategically. s3
Scholars such as Reva Siegel, William Eskridge, and Jack Balkin have
begun to develop a broader theory of social-movement engagement with law
that resonates with contemporary developments in social-movement theory. 4
Eskridge focuses on the civil rights, women's rights, and gay rights
movements, arguing that "constitutional doctrine not only channelled] the
energies of these social movements and countermovements, but also
channel[ed] their rhetoric and perhaps even their ideologies into the furrows
plowed by judges and law professors.""s In time, the movements returned the
favor.s6 Siegel has similarly argued that the U.S. Constitution "elicits and
channels dispute."' Movements are drawn to and influenced by constitutional
law because they understand it to be "semantically permeable," made of open-
textured principles and authored by "the People.,, 8 But "constitutional
argument can transform ... conflicts" because those drawn to it end up
framing conflicts "in light of constitutional values and the narratives
understood to vindicate those values." 9
Siegel's more recent work argues that the Constitution and U.S.
constitutional culture encourage groups vying for control over law to modulate
their arguments to appeal to a broad constituency and to respond to the
counterarguments offered by their opponents.6° Movements therefore mute as
well as provoke social conflict, and "create[] areas of apparent or actual
convergence in which the [Supreme] Court [can] decide cases. ' ' 61 The result is
53. Id. at 1202-03.
54. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U.
PA. L. REv. 927 (2006); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Some Effects of Identity-Based Social
Movements on Constitutional Law in the Twentieth Century, 100 MICH. L. REV. 2062 (2002);
Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective,
150 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (2001).
55. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Channeling: Identity-Based Social Movements and Public Law, 15o U.
PA. L. REv. 419, 480 (2oo).
56. Id. at 423 ("The channeling effect is not one-way. Just as constitutional law has influenced
the rhetoric, strategies, and norms of social movements, so the movements have affected the
rhetoric, strategies, and norms of American public law.").
s. Siegel, supra note 54, at 321.
58. Id. at 322.
59. Id. at 326.
6o. Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change:
The Case of the de Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REv. 1323, 1352-56 (2006).
61. Id. at 1331.
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that "[b]itter constitutional dispute can be hermeneutically constructive, and
has little noticed socially integrative effects.",
6
,
Thus, a small contingent of legal scholars has recently begun to theorize the
relationship between law and what are, in effect, the framing processes of social
movements. Recent turns in social-movement theory and law-and-social-
movements scholarship have thus created fertile new ground for dialogue. It is
this terrain that we must mine if we are to understand the processes that have
led to the emergence of the A2K coalition and, less intuitively, to the emergence
of the coalition of intellectual property industries before it.
II. FROM INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TO ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE
Intellectual property law has been the location of tremendous conflict and
flux in recent years. As the pages that follow describe, IP rights have become
significantly stronger over the past thirty years, in both the domestic and
international realms. The most widely accepted explanation for this trend is
derived from public choice theory. IP rights, the argument goes, create
opportunities for potentially lucrative rents. Businesses that could benefit from
such rents recognize this fact and will generally be willing to spend up to the
amount of their potential rents in order to secure these rights. Those most hurt
by stronger IP are industries based upon copying, which do not enjoy
monopoly rents, and average consumers, each of whom may be hurt in small
ways and/or far in the future. In the "market" for law, then, IP industries
purportedly enjoy a significant advantage.
How, then, are we to understand the recent countermovement that has
emerged, and the recent shift in the political valence of IP law? This Part
describes the recent strengthening of IP law and the emerging
countermobilization and explains why public choice theories do not, in fact,
fully and satisfactorily explain either event. Acts of framing have been central to
both contexts and have permitted those involved to interpret their interests,
forge common cause with others, and justify the legal action they have sought
in terms that can persuade others. The frames adopted in the process of this
mobilization and countermobilization matter because frames are not merely
resources that can be wielded to serve their makers. They also generate
opportunities for a group's opponents and make possible unpredictable chains
of argument and counterargument.
62. Id.
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A. The Historical Evolution of Enclosure and A,2K
As many scholars have noted, "By virtually any measure, intellectual
property rights have expanded dramatically in the last three decades." 6, Yochai
Benkler and James Boyle have analogized the shift to a new "enclosure
movement.' ' 6, Whatever it is called, the nature of the trend is clear: over the
past thirty years, exclusive rights over information have grown broader (to
cover more kinds of information), deeper (giving IP owners more robust rights
of exclusion), and more severe (imposing greater penalties on infringers).
This worldwide phenomenon has been driven significantly by
developments in the United States,6 s so we can begin our discussion here. In
recent years, the scope of patentability expanded significantly,6 6 standards for
nonobviousness diminished, 6, the experimental-use exemption was
weakened,6 and patents became significantly more likely to be upheld in the
63. Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1042
(2005); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 1-4 (2004); William W. Fisher III, The Growth of Intellectual
Property: A History of Ownership of Ideas in the United States 22 (n.d.) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/tfisher/iphistory.pdf,
translated in Geistiges Eigentum - ein ausufernder Rechtsbereich: Die Geschichte des Ideenschutzes
in den Vereinigten Staaten, in EIGENTUM IM INTERNATIONALEN VERGLEICH [INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTWES ON PROPERTY] (Hannes Siegrist & David Sugarman eds., 1999).
64. Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the
Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999); James Boyle, The Second Enclosure Movement
and the Construction of the Public Domain, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at
33.
65. See, e.g., GRAHAM DUTFIELD, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE LIFE SCIENCE
INDUSTRIES 8 (2003).
66. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 63, at 4-5.
67. See Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 823-27 (1988) (contending that the Federal Circuit
transformed the secondary effects test of "commercial success" in ways that made it easier
for inventions to be judged nonobvious); Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in
Biotechnology: Addressing New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 833 (1999) ("In
considering DNA-based inventions, the [Federal Circuit] has employed nonobviousness in a
manner that dramatically lowers the bar for patentability .... "). But see Lee Petherbridge &
R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and Patentability: An Empirical Assessment of the Law of
Obviousness, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2051, 2055 (2007) (arguing that "much of the current
commentary may overstate the concerns with the Federal Circuit's approach to
obviousness"). The Supreme Court recently raised the obviousness standard, although
exactly how much is unclear. See KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007).
68. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3 d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002). A reasonably robust de facto
research exemption seems to exist currently in academia, as researchers frequently ignore
patents and are only rarely sued for infringement. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and
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face of challenges in the courts. 6 9 The protectable subject matter of copyright
law likewise expanded, most prominently to include software.7' The term of
copyright protection was extended repeatedly, 7 and enforcement actions
against private, noncommercial copiers became more common.72 Penalties for
violating copyright became harsher, and the rights accorded to owners, for
example to prevent derivative uses, became more robust.73 Finally, entirely new
forms of protection emerged, such as a sui generis system to protect plant
varieties and exclusive rights in data used to register pharmaceutical
products.74 Interesting questions can be raised about whether all of these
changes in law should be categorized together and about the appropriate
baseline against which to measure the "strengthening" of IP law.7' There is
Data-Sharing in Public Science, 15 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 1013, 1018-19 (2006); John P.
Walsh, Charlene Cho & Wesley M. Cohen, View from the Bench: Patents and Material
Transfers, 309 SCI. 2002 (2005). Such scientists arguably are in a precarious position,
however, and certainly in a worse position after Madey than they were before.
69. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 104-07 (2004);
Merges, supra note 67, at 822.
70. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 1O, 117 (2000); see also id. § 102(a)(4) (choreographic works); id.
5 102(a) (8) (architectural works).
7i. See, e.g., Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 1O5-298, 112 Stat. 2827 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); An Act for the General Revision of
the Copyright Law, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §§ 303-304, 90 Stat. 2541, 2573-76 (1976) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.); see also Uruguay Round Agreements Act,
Pub. L. No. 103-465, io8 Stat. 4809 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 19
U.S.C.) (restoration of foreign copyrights); Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L.
No. 102-307, 1O6 Stat. 264 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.)
(automatic renewal).
72. See Pamela Samuelson, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Historical Perspective,
10 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 319, 335-36 (2003).
73. See Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 337-38
(1989); see also 17 U.S.C. §§ 505-506 (2000).
74. See Plant Variety Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §5 2321-2582 (2000)); see also Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified as amended at 21
U.S.C. §§ 301, 394 (2000)); Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration (Hatch-
Waxman) Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified in scattered sections of 15,
21, & 35 U.S.C.); Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as
amended at 21 U.S.C. 5§ 355, 360aa-36oee; 26 U.S.C. § 45C; 42 U.S.C. § 236 (2000)).
7s. IP scholars discussing the expansion of IP law typically invoke a formal definition of law, or
"law on the books." This has the virtue of being both readily understood and conventional.
(We generally speak of criminal law becoming stronger, for example, when the penalties
associated with a crime are increased, rather than when the rate of a particular crime goes
down.) One might reasonably object that the creation of IP rights in subject matter that
previously did not exist (such as software) cannot be an "expansion" of IP unless one
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clearly room for further specification of the claim, but on balance, it is fair to
say, as many scholars have, that IP law has become stronger, both at a formal
level and practically in many respects.
New technologies also make it possible for rights holders to exert more
control over information at the code level. "Digital rights management"
(DRM) tools or "technical protection measures" have become an important
part of the contemporary appropriation strategies of the information
industries. 76 Adobe uses DRM, for example, to prevent readers of its eBooks
from copying text or using read-aloud programs.7 Sony has developed
"sterile" CDs, which permit users to make only one copy, which in turn cannot
be copied. 7 Agriculture has seen the development of its own analogue to DRM
technologies, so-called terminator genes and other genetic use restriction
technologies designed to enhance the excludability of proprietary plant
varieties. 79 Like DRM, these technologies frequently prevent uses that are
presumes a baseline of free information rather than property. Boyle himself notes this,
suggesting that what he calls the "commons" of the mind might sometimes be more akin to
frontier land or even drained swampland. See Boyle, supra note 64, at 41 n.34. But there are
of course many indicators of the expansion of IP law that do not relate to newly existing
subject matter (for example, lengthening copyright terms, the greater likelihood of success
in patent infringement suits, and the introduction of robust exclusive rights in territories
that previously lacked them). One might also ask whether the practical strength of IP law is
greater today than it was thirty years ago, here invoking "law in action" rather than "law on
the books." The digital era, of course, brings new and formidable enforcement challenges
for rights holders in the area of copyright. It is not clear, however, that the same is true in
patent. Even in copyright, the issue is not easily parsed; while the digital era clearly
undermines some enforcement efforts, it also increases the ability of IP owners to extract
revenue, price discriminate, employ technical protection measures, and detect illegal uses.
See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Pervasively Distributed Copyright Enforcement, 95 GEO. L.J. 1 (2006).
Moreover, the digital age creates new strategies for appropriation even as it undermines old
strategies, see YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 29-90 (20o6), suggesting that
IP law could be stronger when measured against how much exclusivity is needed to generate
the same amount of innovation. Yet another baseline we might use is the frequency with
which individuals encounter IP law in their everyday activities. On that measure, copyright
law has become significantly stronger since the advent of the digital age. See JESSICA LITMAN,
DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 27-28 (2001).
76. See, e.g., Stefan Bechtold, Digital Rights Management in the United States and Europe, 52 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 323 (2004).
r7. Alan Story, Study on Intellectual Property Rights, the Internet, and Copyright 39 n.z4 (n.d.)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/papers/pdfs/
study-papers/sps-story-study.pdf.
78. See BMG Cracks Piracy Whip, WIRED, May 31, 2005, http://www.wired.com/
entertainment/music/news/20o5/o5/67696.
79. See Terminator Technology-Five Years Later, COMMUNIQUt (ETC Group, Ottawa, Can.),
May/June 2003, at 2, available at http://www.etcgroup.org/upload/publication/pdf-file/167.
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permitted in patent law.8° In a sense, information industries are using technical
protection measures to alter the genetic nature of information, manufacturing
scarcity where before there was reproducibility. Although these changes are
technical in nature, they have been accompanied by a supportive legal regime.
Terminator technologies could obviously be the subject of government
regulation, and digital encryption schemes and copy protection measures rely
upon laws such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), which
make it illegal in most circumstances to attempt to circumvent DRM
technologies.1
The trend of expansion in the international realm is even more striking.
The TRIPS Agreement requires all members of the WTO to implement high
levels of substantive IP protection. It requires, for example, patents in all fields
of technology and of no less than twenty years in duration, some form of plant-
variety protection, adherence to most of the Berne Convention on Copyright,
and copyright protection for software object and source code.2 Moreover,
TRIPS is just a floor. The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT),83 which came into
force in 2oo2, is an "optional" WIPO agreement that the United States is
pressing a growing number of countries to join through bilateral trade
agreements. 84 It adds to the substantive protections in the Berne Convention,
for example by requiring signatories to create criminal as well as civil sanctions
for the "remov[al] or alter[ation of] any electronic rights management
information without authority.""'
8o. Id. at 3 ("Unlike patents and plant breeders' rights, Terminator seeds are not time-limited,
there is no user exemption for farmers, researchers or breeders, and no threat of compulsory
licensing."). In the copyright area, there is a growing literature proposing legal solutions to
the problem of overbroad technical protection measures that restrict fair uses. See, e.g., Dan
L. Burk & Julie E. Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HAPV. J.L.
& TECH. 41 (2001); Jacqueline D. Lipton, Solving the Digital Piracy Puzzle: Disaggregating Fair
Use from the DMCA's Anti-Device Provisions, 19 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 111 (2005); Jerome H.
Reichman, Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Pamela Samuelson, A Reverse Notice and Takedown
Regime To Enable Public Interest Uses of Technically Protected Copyrighted Works, 22 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 981 (2008).
81. 17 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1205 (2000); see also Cohen, supra note 75.
82. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights arts. 9, 10, 27, 33,
Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 [hereinafter TRIPS].
83. WIPO Copyright Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, S. TREATY Doc. NO. 105-17, 36 I.L.M. 65.
84- COMM'N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY 106-07 (2002), available at http://www.iprcommission.org/
papers/pdfs/final-report/CIPRfullfinal.pdf [hereinafter CIPR Report].
8S. See WIPO Copyright Treaty art. 12(1)(i), supra note 83, S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-17, at 11, 36
I.L.M. at 71.
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The United States and European Union have also used bilateral and
regional trade agreements to add to the substantive protections required by
TRIPS. Since 2000, the United States has completed free trade agreements
with more than a dozen countries, and it is pursuing agreements with many
more.8 6 Such agreements typically require signatories to increase IP protection
in a host of areas, for example, by providing sui generis protection for
pharmaceutical registration data, limiting the grounds on which compulsory
licenses can be granted, providing for the extension of patent terms to
compensate for delays arising from regulatory approval processes, providing
for patents on life forms, adhering to the International Union for the
Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV) and the WIPO Copyright
Treaty, enacting local versions of the DMCA, and extending copyright terms.8
Over the last ten to fifteen years, however, numerous groups have emerged
to contest the recent expansion of intellectual property. They have recently
begun to forge alliances with one another and, jointly and severally, have had a
substantial effect on both the substance and political valence of IP law.88 Some
of the earliest moments in this recent mobilization came on the heels of the
negotiations over the TRIPS Agreement. In 1993, for example, more than five
hundred thousand farmers demonstrated in Bangalore, India, demanding that
their government reject the TRIPS Agreement and exclusive rights in seed
86. See Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), Bilateral Trade Agreements,
http://www.ustr.gov/TradeAgreements/Bilateral/Section_Index.html (last visited Nov. 25,
2007).
s. See, e.g., Ruth L. Okediji, Back to Bilateralism? Pendulum Swings in International Intellectual
Property Protection, 1 U. OTrAWA L. & TECH. J. 125 (2004); Carsten Fink & Patrick
Reichenmiller, Tightening TRIPS: The Intellectual Property Provisions of Recent US Free Trade
Agreements, TRADE NOTE (World Bank Group, Washington, D.C.), Feb. 7, 2005, at 1-2. A
new bipartisan agreement on trade policy has, however, recently moderated the USTR's
mandate in the IP area. See infra note 158.
88. Several scholars have also noted these trends. See, e.g., Balkin & Siegel, supra note 54, at 948-
49; James Boyle, Cultural Environmentalism and Beyond, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs., Spring
2007, at 5, 15-17; Rosemary J. Coombe, Commodity Culture, Private Censorship, Branded
Environments, and Global Trade Politics: Intellectual Property as a Topic of Law and Society
Research, in THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO LAW AND SOCIETY 369, 387 (Austin Sarat ed.,
2004); Susan K. Sell, Post-TRIPS Developments: The Tension Between Commercial and Social
Agendas in the Context of Intellectual Property, 14 FLA. J. INT'L L. 193, 216 (2002); Susan K. Sell,
Books, Drugs, and Seeds 14-15 (Mar. 20, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.tacd.org/events/intellectual-property/s-sell.doc; cf. Madhavi Sunder, IP3, 59
STAN. L. REV. 257, 331-32 (2006) (considering the diverse set of groups and claims emerging
to contest IP law, arguing that these claims should be understood through rubrics of
identity politics and culture, and positing that they suggest "a broader normative purpose
for intellectual property").
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stocks for multinational firms.89 It was only one in a series of similar actions
around India in the surrounding months. 9° The Indian protests were the most
visible manifestation of a network of farmers in developing countries and
NGOs organizing around the subject, united with "striking uniformity" by
their sense that "the international IPR regime is heavily weighted against
farmers." 9'
Campaigns such as these rapidly built cross-border networks in order to
contest newly internationalizing IP law. In 1993, for example, farmers' rights
advocates built an international campaign against one company's efforts to
obtain U.S. and E.U. patents related to extractions of an insecticidal compound
from the Indian neem tree. 92 The fact that the tree could be used to produce a
pesticide had been known for many years in India. 93 Activists filed a patent
reexamination request in the United States accompanied by signatures "of
more than loo,ooo Indians, as well as by more than 225 agricultural, scientific,
and trade groups in 45 countries."9 4 Explaining the action, a leader of the group
said: "'The real battle is whether the genetic resources of the planet will be
maintained as a shared commons or whether this common inheritance will be
commercially enclosed and become the intellectual property of a few big
89. See Martin Khor, Indian Farmers Fight Seed Patents, GREEN LEFT WKLY., Nov. O, 1993,
http://www.greenleft.org.au/1993/122/5o6o.
go. See id.; see also John-Thor Dahlburg, Trade Pact Foes, Cops Clash in India, CHI. SUN-TIMES,
Apr. 6, 1994, at 30S.
gi. Craig Borowiak, Farmers' Rights: Intellectual Property Regimes and the Struggle over Seeds, 32
POL. & SOC'y 511, 512 (2004); see also SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 140-46
(2003) (describing the emergence of the farmers' rights movement and advocacy around
plant variety protection). Farmers' rights protests continue to this day, and not only in
India. See, e.g., Denise Caruso, Someone (Other Than You) May Own Your Genes, N.Y. TIMEs,
Jan. 28, 2007, at 3 (discussing recent protests in Peru).
9g. The company, W.R. Grace & Co., secured such patents in the United States. See U.S. Patent
No. 5,124,349 (filed Oct. 31, 199o); U.S. Patent No. 4,946,681 (filed June 26, 1989); see also
Shubha Ghosh, Globalization, Patents, and Traditional Knowledge, 17 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 73,
1o6 (2003). The company also applied for such a European patent. See Eur. Patent No.
EP0436257B1 (filed Dec. 20, 199o); Chris Hamilton, Biodiversity, Biopiracy and Benefits:
What Allegations of Biopiracy Tell Us About Intellectual Property, 6 DEVELOPING WORLD
BIOETHICS 158, 165 (2006). On the emergence of the campaign in India, see Linda Bullard,
Freeing the Free Tree: A Briefing Paper on the First Legal Defeat of a Biopiracy Patent 6
(Mar. 2oo5) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.ifoam.org/press/
press/pdfs/BriefingNeem.pdf. See also David Dickson & K.S. Jayaraman, Aid Groups Back
Challenge to Neem Patents, 377 NATURE 95 (1995) (discussing demonstrations led by the
Karnataka state farmers' association). On its internationalization, see Ghosh, supra at io6-
o7; and Bullard, supra at 3.
93. Hamilton, supra note 92, at 165.
94. John F. Burns, Tradition in India vs. a Patent in the U.S., N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 15, 1995, at D4.
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corporations."'' 5 The U.S. reexamination appeal failed, but the opposition to
the European patent succeeded, providing what campaigners pronounced the
"First Legal Defeat of a Biopiracy Patent.",
6
In 1995, the Clinton Administration launched an initiative to strengthen
copyright law and to introduce sui generis protections for databases both in the
United States and (with the help of the European Union) at the international
level through WIPO. 97 Almost immediately, the initiatives met strong
opposition from scientific, academic, and consumer rights circles. 9 The
opposition quickly internationalized, as domestic opponents to the Clinton
Administration's plan went to WIPO to press their case.99 The amount and
intensity of attention to copyright and database protection issues among
academic and public interest groups was unprecedented, as was the
international public interest coalition that emerged at WIPO. Their efforts met
with significant success: "In the end, none of the original U.S.-sponsored
digital agenda proposals emerged unscathed from the negotiation process, and
at least one-the proposed database treaty-did not emerge at all."'00
95. Id.
96. Bullard, supra note 92, at 1.
97. See Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WI PO, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 369, 372-73, 418-
19 (1997).
98. See id. at 429, 432-34; see also The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, lo4th Cong. 72-78 (1995) (statement of Peter A. Jaszi);
Colin Macilwain, US Science Lobby Intensifies Attack on Database Pact..., 384 NATURE 299
(1996); J.H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND.
L. REV. 51 (1997); Administration's Copyright Proposal Draws Equal, Opposite Reactions, INFO.
L. ALERT, Dec. 1, 1995, at 6 (excerpting a letter to Congress by the Digital Future Coalition,
representing librarians, computer firms, and public interest groups); James Boyle, Op-Ed.,
Sold Out, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31, 1996, at Ei5; Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED,
Jan. 1996, at 134; Robert M. White, Taking on the Database Challenge-and Winning, TECH.
REv., May/June 1997, at 65; Digital Future Coalition, A Description of the Digital Future
Coalition, http://www.dfc.org/dfcli/Learning-Center/about.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007)
(describing the creation of a coalition of "non-profit educational, scholarly, library, and
consumer groups, together with major commercial trade associations representing leaders in
the consumer electronics, telecommunications, computer, and network access industries"
that emerged in response to the Clinton Administration's digital agenda (emphasis
omitted)).
99. Samuelson, supra note 97, at 374 (citations omitted); see also Digital Future Coalition, supra
note 98.
loo. Samuelson, supra note 97, at 374-75; see also Fisher, supra note 63, at 25 (describing the defeat
of some of the Clinton Administration's white paper proposals as the result of "a publicity
and lobbying campaign waged by a miscellaneous group of scholars, educators, and public-
interest activists").
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A few years later, the access-to-medicines campaign was born, when AIDS
activists and humanitarian organizations joined forces to demand antiretroviral
medicines for the millions of people in developing countries dying of
HIV/AIDS. Patented AIDS medicines were extremely expensive, and
campaigners focused their attention on the refusal of patent-holding
companies to offer significant discounts or permit the use of generic
alternatives and on the limits that the TRIPS Agreement and the trade policies
of countries such as the United States put on countries' abilities to override
patents.1"'
Activists adopted confrontational tactics and achieved rapid results." 2 In
April 2000, they forced thirty-nine multinational drug companies to abandon a
high-profile lawsuit challenging a South African law designed to reduce the
price of medicines there.'0° Another important victory came in 2001 at a VTO
ministerial meeting in Qatar. As the Wall Street Journal reported, "unlike in
1993, when intellectual-property protections were first negotiated as part of the
initial WTO pact, this time the [drug company] lobbyists were matched by
AIDS activists who proved to be a well-coordinated group of opponents."0 4
The result was the "Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public
Health," which states that the TRIPS Agreement "can and should be
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members' right
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for
all."'05 The Doha Declaration also set in motion a process that resulted in the
first ever amendment to TRIPS (or indeed, to any core WTO agreement),
which gives developing countries marginally more flexibility to use generic
medicines. '"6 But perhaps the most significant measure of the success of the
campaign has been the drastic fall in the price of antiretroviral medicines. In a
few years, the world-best price of first-line triple-combination HIV/AIDS
101. See, e.g., Barton Gellman, A Conflict of Health and Profit: Gore at Center of Trade Policy
Reversal on AIDS Drugs to S. Africa, WASH. POST, May 21, 2000, at Ai. For a description of
the movement written by a key participant, see Ellen 't Hoen, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical
Patents, and Access to Essential Medicines: A Long Way from Seattle to Doha, 3 CHi. J. INT'L L. 27
(2002).
102. See, e.g., Gellman, supra note ioi.
103. See Rachel L. Swarns, Drug Makers Drop South Afica Suit over AIDS Medicines, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 20, 2001, atAl.
104. Geoff Winestock & Helene Cooper, Activists Outmaneuver Drug Makers at WTO, WALL ST.
J., Nov. 14, 20o, at A2.
105. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001 on the TRIPS
Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(o0)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002). "
1o6. Press Release, World Trade Org., Members OK Amendment To Make Health Flexibility
Permanent (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.wto.org/English/news-e/presos5e/pr426e.htm.
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therapy purchased from originator companies dropped by ninety-five percent,
and generics became available in many developing countries at a discount of
ninety-nine percent."'
In 2003, two Swarthmore students, Nelson Pavlovsky and Luke Smith,
founded the "Swarthmore Coalition for the Digital Commons. " "s The group
met regularly to discuss what they called issues of the "intellectual commons,"
including "drug patents, music downloading, and Monsanto's crop patents.'
'10 9
It was just a discussion group, until Pavlovsky and Smith decided to post
internal memos from a company called Diebold on the Internet. The memos
described systemic flaws in Diebold's voting machines, and Diebold was keen
to keep them out of the public eye. The company sent the students (and many
others like them) cease-and-desist letters asserting that the posting was an act
of copyright infringement. The students found some powerful allies, Diebold
retreated, and Smith and Pavlovsky ultimately won a copyright abuse suit
against the company."0 They then set their sights on a new challenge: creating
a "Free Culture" movement on college campuses around the world, in order to
"reverse the recent radical expansion of intellectual property" and "build a
technological and cultural movement to defend the digital commons."'
Despite its recent beginnings, it now has more than thirty chapters in the
United States and some germinating in other countries too." ' As a profile in
the New York Times recently remarked, members of the Free Culture
movement "talk about the group's goals with something like the reverence that
earlier generations displayed in talking about social or racial equality.".13
107. MDECINS SANS FRONTItRES [DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS], UNTANGLING THE WEB OF
PRICE REDUCTIONS 5 (9 th ed. 20o6), available at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/
news/hiv-aids/untangled.pdf. These price reductions do not mean, of course, that the
problem of access to H1V/AIDS treatment has been solved, or that price is no longer an
issue. See UNAIDS & WORLD HEALTH ORG., AIDS EPIDEMIC UPDATE 5, 7-8 (2007); Robert
Steinbrook, Closing the Affordability Gap for Drugs in Low-Income Countries, 357 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1996 (2007).
io8. See FreeCulture.org, About, http://freeculture.org/about (last visited Nov. 2, 2007); see also
John Schwartz, File Sharing Pits Copyright Against Free Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2003, at
Ci; Emily Hawkins, Swarthmore Free Culture: Two Teenage Digital Davids Down Diebold,
CAMPUS PROGRESS, http ://www.campusprogress.org/tools/169/digital-davids-down-
diebold (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
iog. Hawkins, supra note 1o8.
n1o. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
iii. FreeCulture.org, Manifesto, http://freeculture.org/manifesto (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
112. See FreeCulture.org, supra note 1o8.
113. Rachel Aviv, File-Sharing Students Fight Copyright Constraints, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 2007, at
B7.
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The Free Culture movement is in many ways the child of the Creative
Commons movement, which was begun in 2001 by law professor Lawrence
Lessig, with the support of colleagues such as James Boyle and Eric Eldred."4
The Creative Commons project seeks to "build a layer of reasonable copyright
on top of the extremes that now reign.""' It does this by offering creators a
series of copyright licenses that give users more rights than they would have
under the default rules of copyright law, for example the right to make
derivative works or to reproduce covered material for noncommercial
purposes. " ' Use of the licenses has grown exponentially in the last few years,
and today they govern an estimated sixty million copyrighted works around
the world. "17
Recent years have also seen the emergence and extraordinary success of free
and open-source software paradigms. Such software is created by volunteers,
and sustained by an open-licensing scheme that guarantees users' rights to
share and modify the software source code." 8 Free and open-source software
programs such as Linux have become major components in the worldwide
software market, and have been adopted by leading corporations such as IBM,
HP, and Dell." 9 Successful new enterprises have also emerged to sell services
and support to users of free software, demonstrating that new business models
can be built around informational products that are not governed by rules of
exclusivity. 2 ' Because free and open-source software has been both wildly
successful and contradicts "our longstanding perceptions of how people behave
114. See Christopher M. Kelty, Punt to Culture, 77 ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q.547, 549 (2004); see also
Creative Commons, History (July 13, 2007), http://creativecommons.org/about/history.
115. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 282 (2004).
116. See Creative Commons, Choosing a License: Creative Commons Licenses,
http://creativecommons.org/about/licenses/meet-the-licenses (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
117. See Giorgos Cheliotis et al., Taking Stock of the Creative Commons Experiment:
Monitoring the Use of Creative Commons Licenses and Evaluating Its Implications for the
Future of Creative Commons and for Copyright Law 6 (Aug. 15, 2007) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://web.si.umich.edu/tprc/papers/2oo7/8o5/CreateCommExp
.pdf.
11s. For histories and analyses of the free and open-source software movements, see GLYN
MOODY, REBEL CODE (2001); STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE (2004); and
Eric von Hippel & Georg von Krogh, Open Source Software and the "Private-Collective"
Innovation Model: Issues for Organization Science, 14 ORG. Sci. 209 (2003). For details on the
licensing scheme that underpins free software, see infra text accompanying note 284.
rig. See Kenneth J. Rodriguez, Closing the Door on Open Source: Can the General Public License
Save Linux and Other Open Source Software?, 5 J. HIGH TECH. L. 403, 404 (2005); March of the
Penguin: Linux Wins Battles, but Windows Owns the War, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 17,
2007, at Bi.
120. See, e.g., RedHat Home Page, http://www.redhat.com/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
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and how economic growth occurs,"' 2' it has also been central to the
theorization of a new mode of production that is characteristic of the digital
networked age: the "commons-based peer production model," which "relies on
decentralized information gathering and exchange."' 22
Increasingly, programmers have moved beyond bottom-up private-
ordering strategies to advocate top-down legal change. They have focused
particularly on software patents, which many believe present a significant
threat to the collaborative processes that produce free and open-source
software.'23 Thus, programmers -supported by corporations that have put
open-source software at the center of their business models -recently launched
a vocal campaign against an E.U. patent directive that would have ensured the
availability of software patents throughout Europe. 4 By mobilizing hundreds
of demonstrators and lobbyists, these programmers helped persuade the
European Parliament to abandon that directive.' 5 A German parliamentarian
121. Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369,
446 (2002).
122. Id. at 375.
123. See, e.g., Jean Paul Smets & Hartmut Pilch, Software Patentability with Compensatory
Regulation: A Cost Evaluation, UPGRADE, Dec. 2001, at 23, available at http://www.upgrade-
cepis.org/issues/2oo1/6/up2-6Smets.pdf.
124. See NoSoftwarePatents.com, About the Campaign, http://www.nosoftwarepatents.com/en/
m/about/index.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
125. See Marc Jacoby, How Hartmut Pilch, Avid Computer Geek, Bested Microsoft, WAL ST. J.,
Sept. 12, 20o6, at Ai (describing the protests and lobbying at the European Parliament, and
quoting one Member of Parliament stating that it was "the sheer volume and number of
people" that caused Parliament to vote against the software directive); see also Mark F.
Schultz & David B. Walker, How Intellectual Property Became Controversial: NGOs and the
New International IP Agenda, ENGAGE, Oct. 2005, at 82, 92, available at http://www.fed-soc
.org/doclib/2o07o321Octos.pdf (crediting the movement with "blocking software patents
in the EU"). The defeat should be kept in perspective: the European Patent Office (EPO)
has effectively granted many software patents already, permitting them if they are directed
at a "technical process" rather than the software itself. See EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE,
GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION Pt. C, ch. IV- 4 (2005); Michael Guntersdorfer, Software
Patent Law: United States and Europe Compared, 2003 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 0006,
http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/PDF/2o03DLTRooo6.pdf. But the
European Patent Convention explicitly forbids patents on software as such. European Patent
Convention § 52(2)(c), 13 I.L.M. 268, 285 (1974), available at http://www.european-patent
-office.org/legal/epc/pdf/epc_2oo6_v5_bm en.pdf. EPO member countries (who are not
identical with E.U. countries) are also free to take a different view when it comes to
enforcing a patent issued by the EPC. This led to the argument for the European Union
directive, which would have ostensibly "codified" the EPO standard and ensured that E.U.
members uniformly enforced software patents. See Andreas Grosche, Software Patents-Boon
or Bane for Europe?, 14 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 257 (2006); Jack George Abid, Note, Software
Patents on Both Sides of the Atlantic, 23 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 81s, 832 (2005);
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who led the attempt to pass the law gave the following pithy account of its
demise: "'They produced a whole movement.... Industry was sleeping.12
6
More and more programmers seem to be warming to the activist role. In
France, computer enthusiasts recently staged street demonstrations and
demanded to be arrested for violating digital rights management systems that,
for example, prevent an individual from playing iTunes music files on a
portable player other than an iPod.2 7
In the past several years, there have also been attempts by key architects of
this new politics to build something more sustained and interconnected. As the
previous pages demonstrate, the recent surge of advocacy around intellectual
property issues has always oscillated between local and global, often within
very short timeframes and in the same campaign. But attempts to conjoin all of
these groups under the rubric of the "access to knowledge movement" and to
try to create a common framework through which to articulate their concerns
came only very recently.
Perhaps the most significant flashpoint was in 2004, when Brazil and
Argentina, seeking to capitalize on the growing discontent among public
interest groups and developing-country governments regarding international
IP law, proposed that WIPO revisit its mandate and adopt what they called a
"development agenda." The aim was to secure a new commitment within
WIPO to the concerns and needs of developing countries and a willingness to
explore the potential of non-IP based models of innovation, such as open-
source software and open genomics."8 In conjunction with this proposal,
advocates organized a meeting in Geneva that brought policymakers and
business representatives together with participants in the access-to-medicines,
free-software, Creative Commons, open-science, and open-publishing
see also Robert Bray, The European Union "Software Patents" Directive: What Is It? Why Is It?
Where Are We Now?, 2005 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 0o11, http://www.law.duke.edu/joumals/
dltr/articles/PDF/2oosDLTRooii.pdf.
126. See Jacoby, supra note 125.
127. Thomas Crampton, Their Crime: Playing iTunes on Devices Not Named iPod, N.Y. TIMEs,
Oct. 9, 2006, at C4 . Apple has since begun to sell some DRM-free tracks, initially making
them more expensive but recently reducing their price to the standard $0.99. Joshua
Chaffin, Apple Slashes Price of DRM-Free Songs Online, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 17, 2007,
at 20.
128. WIPO, Proposal by Argentina and Brazil for the Establishment of a Development Agenda for
WIPO, 31st (i 5th Extraordinary) Sess., WO/GA/31/11 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at
http://www.wipo.intdocuments/en/document/govbody/wo-gb-ga/pdf/wo-ga-31-ii.pdf
[hereinafter Development Agenda Proposal].
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campaigns.12 9 The meeting endorsed the proposal for a development agenda,
and produced a three-page document entitled the "Geneva Declaration on the
Future of the World Intellectual Property Organization. ' 13° Signed by more
than five hundred individuals, this declaration reads like nothing so much as a
manifesto for a new movement.
"Humanity faces a global crisis in the governance of knowledge,
technology, and culture," the Geneva Declaration proclaims, and cites as
evidence widespread lack of access to medicines, global inequalities in access to
education and technology, growing obstacles to follow-on innovation,
misappropriation of the public domain, and increasing concentration and
anticompetitive practices in the knowledge industries.13 It goes on to
emphasize the success of new modes of knowledge production such as open-
source software and Wikipedia, and insists that "[h]umanity stands at a
crossroads -a fork in our moral code and a test of our ability to adapt and
grow." 32 It poses the choice as one between existing policies, which it calls
"intellectually weak, ideologically rigid, and sometimes brutally unfair and
inefficient," and new models to produce and govern informational goods.133 It
calls for a "moratorium on new treaties and harmonization of standards that
expand and strengthen monopolies and further restrict access to knowledge,"
urges the negotiation of a "Treaty on Access to Knowledge and Technology,"
and demands fundamental procedural reforms in WIPO to render it more
responsive to the needs of developing countries and more open to participation
from public interest groups. 34
The WIPO membership voted to create a committee to consider the
adoption of a development agenda,3 ' and NGOs and activists took advantage
of the opening by convening further international meetings to define that
agenda. One result was a document that might be thought of as a preliminary
campaign platform for this new mobilization: a draft Access to Knowledge
Treaty. Two themes unite many of the proposals in the text: the idea that
129. See Trans Atlantic Consumer Dialogue, The Future of WIPO (Sept. 13, 2004),
http://www.tacd.org/events/wipo/index.htm.
130. See Geneva Declaration on the Future of the World Intellectual Property Organization,
http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/futureofwipodeclaration.pdf (last visited Nov. 2, 2007)
[hereinafter Geneva Declaration].
131. Id. at 1.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2.
135. World Intellectual Property Organization, WIPO General Assembly Report 146,
WO/GA/32/13 (Oct. 5, 2005).
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"'restrictions on access ought to be the exception, not the other way around,"'
and that "both subject matter exclusions from, and exceptions and limitations
to, intellectual property protection standards are mandatory rather than
permissive. '' 136 Notably, the treaty addresses not only users' rights, but also
rights and structures intended to benefit open-source models of innovation. 137
The Access to Knowledge Treaty is a prototype more than a completed
proposal, but intraissue collaborations have since spread to other fora. In 2005,
leading figures in the free software movement, the farmers' rights movement,
the open genomics movement, the Creative Commons, librarian organizations,
and the access-to-medicines movement, along with the Minister of Culture of
Brazil, drafted the "Adelphi Charter," a set of principles that they contend
governments and international agencies should respect when modifying IP
laws . 3' Low-level conferences to generate dialogue between groups such as
software programmers and farmers' rights advocates are also being
organized.'3 9 Knowledge-rights activists are also increasingly issuing calls for
greater cooperation and sharing between them. An editorial recently published
by the farmers' rights organization GRAIN, for example, urged that if those
"working on free software, no-patents-on-life, access to generic drugs,
traditional medicine, digital rights, peer-to-peer networking and 'fair use' came
together and formulated one common platform to rein in the IPR system, the
effect could be explosive."' 4' New umbrella organizations such as "IP-Watch"
136. Laurence R. Heifer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual Property, 40 U.C.
DAvis L. REV. 971, 1013 (2007).
137. See A2K Treaty, supra note i; id. art. 3.1 (creating exceptions and limitations to copyright
law); id. art. 5.1 (creating a "knowledge commons committee ... to promote cooperation
and investment in databases, open access journals and other open knowledge projects that
expand the knowledge commons"). I should note that I participated in the meeting and
discussions that produced the draft treaty.
138. Adelphi Charter on Creativity, Innovation, and Intellectual Property (Oct. 13, 2005),
http://www.sitoc.biz/adelphicharter/pdfs/adelphi-charter2.pdf [hereinafter Adelphi
Charter].
139. See, e.g., FTA Watch et al., Fighting FTAs: An International Strategy Workshop, Bangkok,
Thailand (July 27, 20o6), available at http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/Fighting-FTAs-
summary-report.pdf; Frederick Noronha, India at the Forefront of Knowledge Commons
Debate, IrrrELL. PROP. WATCH, Sept. 3, 20o6, http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/i
ndex.php?p=389&res=128o_ff.
140. Editorial, Freedom From IPR: Towards a Convergence of Movements, SEEDLING, Oct. 2004, at 3,
available at http://www.grain.org/seedling/?id=301; see also David M. Berry & Giles Moss,
The Politics of the Libre Commons, FIRST MONDAY, Sept. 2006,
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issuell_9/berry/index.html (arguing that the open-
source and free commons struggles could come together to form a radical democratic
project).
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and "IP Justice" have recently been created to contribute to and to report on the
activities of these groups.
141
These overt attempts to build interissue platforms are also mirrored by a
wave of everyday cross-references and collaborations. For example, when asked
why the Brazilian government was migrating its computers to open-source
software, Brazil's top technology official, S6rgio Amadeu, explained that the
shift would reduce licensing fees, support a national effort to increase
computer access, and promote the development of local technological
industries.'42 Then he added a fourth reason: "Free software is like generic
drugs.' 143 Creative Commons explains that it drew inspiration for its licenses
from those that govern free software. 1" Richard Stallman, one of the founders
of the free-software movement, recently published a letter in an open content
journal declaring that free software and open publishing are "based on the
same fundamental principle: knowledge contributes to society when it can be
shared and developed by communities. '14 A prominent farmer's rights
organization encourages visitors to its Web site to learn about "Software
Freedom Day.' 6 Scientist Richard Jefferson, who recently invented an
important new genomics tool that is governed by an open-source license (also
modeled on open-source software licenses), states that "'[e]verything that open
source has been fighting in software is exactly where we find ourselves now
with biotechnology. 1 47
NGOs and activist coalitions that emerged independently of one another to
contest the contours of IP rights in seeds, medicines, software, genetic
material, and cultural goods are thus beginning to build links to one another.
The structure of this emerging mobilization is more akin to a network than a
pyramid.' 8 Like many networks, this one is characterized not only by
141. See Intellectual Property Watch, Mission, http://ip-watch.org/mission.phpres=lo24_ff
(last visited Nov. 2, 2007); IP Justice, Our Mission, http://ipjustice.org/wp/about/mission/
(last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
142. Jonathan Karp, A Brazilian Challenge for Microsoft: The Government's Preference for Open-
Source Software May Tilt the Playing Field, WAM ST. J., Sept. 9, 2003, at A14.
143. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
144. See Creative Commons, supra note 114.
145. Richard Stallman, Free Community Science and the Free Development of Science, 2 PLoS MED.
o169, 0170 (2005).
146. GRAIN, Freedom from IPR, http://www.grain.org/V?m (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
147. Thomas Goetz, Open Source Everywhere, WIRED, Nov. 2003, at 158, 211,
http://www.wired.con-Vwired/archive/ii.ii/opensource.html.
148. By this I mean to suggest that the mobilization is arranged through horizontal and
overlapping webs of association rather than through a centralized and vertical structure of
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horizontal connections between actors engaged in advocacy around IP, but also
by "hubs," or groups and individuals who are prominent within the network
for the density and intensity of their connections. 149 These key participants are
seeking to create a set of shared principles, arguments, and identities between
groups that are otherwise divided by their substantive or regional focus.
These groups have also begun to have, jointly and severally, a significant
impact on IP law. Some such effects have been noted above: the successes of
the access-to-medicines campaign in obtaining an amendment to TRIPS and
bringing down the prices of HIV/AIDS medicines; the success of free-software
programmers in preventing the codification of software patents in Europe; and
the expansive growth of the private ordering schemes introduced by
proponents of free software and the Creative Commons.
Some of the most significant changes that these groups have inaugurated
are those underway at WIPO. The political dynamic triggered by the
development-agenda process has created a significant challenge to the agency's
mandate. Negotiations over new treaties creating broadcasting rights and
further harmonizing substantive patent law very recently fell apart, with
developed countries disagreeing with one another, developing countries
objecting, and A2K groups in active opposition.15 A2K advocates, in concert
with supportive developing country governments, successfully pressed WIPO
to create a new standing committee to discuss the impact of IP on
hierarchy. See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF THE NETWORK SOCIETY 501-02 (2d ed. 2000)
(describing a network as "a set of interconnected nodes," that is "highly dynamic," "open,"
and "susceptible to innovating without threatening its balance"). Like Keck and Sikkink, I
use the term to emphasize the "fluid and open relations among committed and
knowledgeable actors working in specialized issue areas," KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 2, at
8, the "voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal patterns of... exchange" between participants,
id., and the "dense exchanges of information and services" within the network, id. at 2.
149. We might begin identifying the hubs in this new network by examining the participants in
prominent A2K initiatives, such as the Adelphi Charter, see Adelphi Charter on Creativity,
Innovation and Intellectual Property, Who Are We?, http://www.sitoc.biz/adelphicharter/
group.asp.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2007); the Geneva Declaration, see Signing the Geneva
Declaration on the Future of WIPO (Oct. 7, 2004), http://www.cptech.org/ip/wipo/
signatures.htmI; and the Access to Knowledge Treaty, see Access to Knowledge (A2K),
http://www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k-debate.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2007). A list of hubs of the
A2K network would include scholars, activists, NGOs, and even some representatives from
government and business. Most are based in northern countries, but there is significant and
influential participation from grassroots activists and actors based in developing countries.
150. See Schultz & Walker, supra note 125, at 82; Frances Williams, Piracy Collapses Broadcasting
Treaty, FIN. TIMES (London), June 24, 2007, http://www.ft.con-/cms/s/o/71ed85da-22 5e
-1idc-ac53-ooobsdflo621.html; WIPO Broadcast Treaty Talks Collapse, BRIDGES (Int'l Centre
for Trade & Sustainable Dev., Geneva, Switz.), June 27, 2007, at 4.
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development,"s' to make the agency's technical assistance programs better serve
the interests of developing countries, and to "promote norm-setting activities
related to IP that support a robust public domain in WIPO's Member
States."" 2 Developing countries have also urged WIPO to take up proposals to
articulate minimum exceptions and limitations in areas such as copyright,
pointing to the possibility that WIPO could be used to create ceilings, and not
just floors, for IP rights."5 3
In the United States, significant changes in patent law are also underway.
Major reports from both the Federal Trade Commission and the National
Academy of Sciences have expressed concern that patent law has become
overgrown and have recommended major reform. 4 After many years of
implicitly ceding the realm to the Federal Circuit, the Supreme Court has
stepped decisively back into the arena. The past few years have seen "the
highest level of patent activity at the Court in forty years."'55 The result has
been a series of decisions that have diminished the power of patents."s6
Precisely how much awaits determination in the lower courts, but these cases
have sent a clear signal of concern that the U.S. patent system has become too
strong and may be stifling rather than promoting innovation.5 7 A new
bipartisan agreement on trade policy that was recently negotiated in Congress
151. WIPo, Provisional Committee on Proposals Related to a WIPO Development Agenda
(PCDA) (June 11, 2007), http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/pcdao7_session4
.html.
152. Id.
153. WIPO, Proposal by Chile on the Analysis of Exceptions and Limitations, WO/SCCR/13/5 (Nov.
22, 2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/copyright/en/sccr_13/
sccr_13_5.pdf.
154. FED. TRADE COMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION
AND PATENT LAw AND POLICY (2003), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/io/
innovationrpt.pdf; NAT'L ACAD. OF Scis., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004).
155. Harold C. Wegner, Wegner's Top Ten Supreme Court Patent Cases, IP FRONTLINE, Nov. 28,
2005, at 1, 2, available at http://www.ipfrontline.com/downloads/SupremeCourtNov28.pdf.
156. See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837
(2006).
157- See, e.g., KSR Int'l Co., 127 S. Ct. at 1741 (noting that "[g]ranting patent protection to
advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation retards
progress"); eBay Inc., 126 S. Ct. at 1842 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting that "in many
instances the nature of the patent being enforced and the economic function of the patent
holder present considerations quite unlike earlier cases" and making reference to the
emergence of patent holders who do not work patents but exist only to seek licensing fees,
as well as the "suspect validity" of some business method patents).
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has ratcheted back the U.S. Trade Representative's (USTR's) mandate to
increase IP protection through free trade agreements, particularly with
developing country trading partners."'
As of this writing, a bipartisan patent reform bill is also pending that would
make meaningful changes in the patent system in order to address perceived
problems with patent quality and the expense of patent litigation." 9 The
process that has led to this reform effort has also turned up significant rifts in
the coalition of IP industries. As one newspaper editorial page characterized it,
patent reform negotiations have
brought on a fight between two usually like-minded allies, biotech and
computer technology. Other groups - financial services, universities,
research firms, and small inventors -are taking sides too.... In broad
terms, large tech firms want patents harder to get, easier to challenge
and worth less when infringement occurs. Big players, such as Cisco or
Intel, claim "patent trolls" target their products with longshot claims
over a small part in a router or computer chip.... Biotech has a
different gripe. A pill built around a lab-created molecule or protein
fold may need only a few patents. Biotech firms spend millions of
dollars to develop silver-bullet drugs that need years of sales to pay
back the investment. These firms want the nuclear option that tough
patent defenses bring: Infringe on our product, and we'll destroy you in
court. 160
All of these signals point to a significant shift in the political valence of the field
of IP in a few short years. A once strong industry coalition is beginning to fray.
Courts, legislators, and international agencies are increasingly receptive to
arguments that IP rights have become too restrictive. Calls for a reorientation
1S8. The new agreement provides, inter alia, that the USTR will not seek many of the TRIPS-
plus provisions that it has sought in the past, and that all FTAs will expressly recognize the
freedom of developing countries to use TRIPS flexibilities to protect the health of their
populations. U.S. Trade Representative, Bipartisan Agreement on Trade Policy: Intellectual
Property Provisions (May 2007), available at http://www.ustr.gov/
assets/DocumentLibrary/FactSheets/20o7/asset-upload fle3121283.pdf.
159. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, S. 1145, 1moth Cong. (2007); Patent Reform Act of 2007,
H.R. 19o8, iioth Cong. (2007). The bill would, inter alia, create postgrant oppositions with
limited estoppel effect and limit the damages awarded after infringement to the value of the
patented segment over the prior art, not the value of the product as a whole.
16o. Editorial, The Laptop vs. the Pill Bottle, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 5, 2007, at E4; see also Stephen
Heuser, High Tech, Biotech Clashing on Patent Bill, BOSTON GLOBE, July 19, 2007, at Ai
(describing the conflicts further); Lisa Lerer, Finance Industry Leads on Patent Reform,
POLITICO, July 31, 2007, http://www.poliico.com/news/stories/0707/i87.htm (same).
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in the field are increasingly audible, and public interest groups and developing
countries are enjoying increasing success in asserting their agenda at local and
international levels. Groups that have emerged to contest IP norms in different
subject areas are now forming alliances across their differences. How should
we understand these events?
B. IP and AK as Mobilizing Frames
The predominant account in IP scholarship of the recent expansion in IP
law draws on public choice theory.' 6, William Landes and Richard Posner, for
example, point to the "inherent asymmetry between the value that creators of
intellectual property place on having property rights and the value that would-
be copiers place on the freedom to copy without having to obtain a license" that
results from the fact that exclusive rights "can shower economic rents on the
holder of that right, but copiers can hope to obtain only a competitive
return. ',, 62 These pressures, they suggest, account for some portion of the
recent and rapid growth in copyright law.
Over the years, many scholars have called attention to the same issue, often
drawing upon Jessica Litman's important early work demonstrating that the
drafting of U.S. copyright law had been effectively delegated to competing
interest groups. 6 3 Today, a wide range of IP scholars have come to agree that
rights holders have had a theoretically and practically disproportionate
influence on IP lawmaking, and to use public choice theories to explain this
fact. 6' The boldest articulations of the argument suggest that public choice
161. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J.
882, 884 (2007).
162. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 63, at 14.
163. See Jessica D. Litman, Copyright, Compromise, and Legislative History, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 857
(1987); Litman, supra note 73.
164. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionalization of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 529, 532-34 (2000); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual
Property Law, 1900-2ooo, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2187, 2235-36 (2000); Pamela Samuelson, Should
Economics Play a Role in Copyright Law and Policy?, U. OTrAWA L. & TECH. J. 1, 9-10 (2004);
Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law?, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1244-46
(1996). Tim Wu argues that there are "two schools" describing the twentieth century
evolution of copyright law: a Demsetzian one that sees the expansion as an efficient
response to the rising value of information and the decreasing costs of copying, and a public
choice school that "sees copyright owners as a discrete and highly organized group whose
lobbying acumen has led to a century of advantageous legislation." Timothy Wu, Copyright's
Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 278, 291-92 (2004); see also id. at 292 (noting that
"[m]ost scholars-even those associated with one or another school-will admit that
copyright's evolution reflects elements of both approaches").
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pressures will exist wherever there are exclusive rights in information. Yochai
Benkler, for example, writes:
Our legislative process demonstrates a systematic imbalance in favor of
the expansion and deepening of exclusive rights to information at the
expense of the public domain. The imbalance exists because the
benefits of such rights are clearly seen by, and expressed by, well-
defined interest holders that exist at the time the legislation is passed.
In contrast, most of the social costs-which are economic, social,
political, and moral-are diffuse and likely to be experienced in the
future by parties not yet aware of the fact that they will be affected by
the extension of rights.165
He further contends that "it is never the case that the diffuse and future users
[of information] will band together to expand fair use. Even if they were to
band together, it is impossible that copyright owners would remain unaware of
the initiative and fail to offer substantial opposition in the legislative
process. 1,, 66 Those who have sought to provide remedies have invoked a
familiar public choice solution to the problem: courts. 6 7 Benkler has argued,
for example, that "it is the role of courts to prevent the systematic and excessive
expansion of exclusive rights by serving as a backstop" against the powerful
lobbying advantages that exclusive-rights-based industries enjoy. 68 He
proposes that courts apply intermediate scrutiny to all copyright legislation.
69
Neil Netanel has contended similarly that "rigorous, albeit 'intermediate,'
scrutiny is warranted in [copyright] cases in part because speech entitlement
allocations give rise to a suspicion of successful rent seeking by the highly
organized interests to whom the entitlements are granted."17 Such arguments
were in fact explicitly (and unsuccessfully) presented to the Supreme Court as
165. Yochai Benkler, Through the Looking Glass: Alice and the Constitutional Foundations of the
Public Domain, LAw&CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 173, 196.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., FARBER & FiuCKEY, supra note 8, at 145-53 (arguing that public choice theory
"provide[s] a basis for a more intelligent judicial response" for courts deciding
constitutional privacy cases because it reveals the political obstacles to organizing around
privacy issues).
168. Benkler, supra note 165, at 197.
169. Id. at 200.
170. Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L.
REv. 1, 6 (2001).
117:804 20o8
THE NEW POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
grounds for striking down a retroactive extension of the copyright term in
Eldred v. Ashcroft.171
These arguments, in their strongest form, suggest that public mobilization
against increasingly strong IP law is improbable or even impossible. 172 And yet,
as the previous Section shows, such a mobilization appears to be emerging and
changing the political valence of IP law. Paradoxically, the Eldred case may have
played a role in this, by providing a locus for mobilization of groups outside
the court.173 At the same time, an industry coalition that once appeared
invincible now shows signs of division.
Existing public choice accounts in the field did not predict this.174 Public
171. 537 U.S. 186, 218-21 (2003).
172. Not all those who have made use of the public choice account, of course, have taken such a
categorical position. See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 164, at 532.
173. Cf Balkin & Siegel, supra note 54, at 948-49 (noting that Eldred "will hardly be the last
word" on the issues at stake in the case, because it marks the beginnings of a new social
movement, and social movements "have the power to change the meaning of law"); Peter
K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 907, 937 (2004) (arguing that
"[i]n recent years, the Eldred litigation and the public domain, free software, and open
source movements have created a tremendous momentum toward a major change in
copyright policy").
174. They might, of course, be retrofitted to better explain these events. Such an account might
begin by noting that some members of the "public" have acute and short-term interests in
opposing strong IP laws (such as poor people living with HJV/AIDS, or students or artists
who are sued for copyright infringement). It might also point out that the digital networked
environment and factors such as cheaper air travel have dramatically lowered barriers to
organizing, especially across borders. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 2, at 14; Lesley J.
Wood & Kelly Moore, Target Practice: Community Activism in a Global Era, in FROM ACT UP
TO THE WTO 21, 25-27 (Benjamin Shepard & Ronald Hayduk eds., 2002). Even with these
modifications, however, dilemmas remain. As the frame-analytic perspective and the pages
that follow suggest, even interests that appear to be acute and material require
interpretation. And those members of the public who have come to understand themselves
as having acute interests in weaker IP law typically have very limited material resources,
particularly when compared with their industry counterparts. Foundations can compensate
for this to some small degree and have provided crucial funding for some A2K groups. But
the resources they devote to these issues pale in comparison to the amount that industry
lobby groups can spend. Moreover, philanthropic foundations themselves do not fit well
into public choice rubrics. See supra note 6. Some businesses that stand to gain from the
A2K agenda have also participated in A2K meetings, but to my knowledge have not
provided substantial funding for A.K initiatives. Moreover, many who participate in the
A2K mobilization are engaged in efforts to advance the interests of others. And the
coalition's success in fact appears to be predicated on changing many individuals'
conceptions of their interests, using the environmental movement as a model. See Boyle,
supra note 64, at 52; see also Boyle, supra note 88, at 6-7.
One might also imagine public choice accounts of the conflict developing between IP
industries: some industries and companies thought they would be able to take advantage of
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choice theory presumes that social actors have fixed interests, and that they do
not need to make complex judgments to determine how their interests can be
advanced. It also does not explain how nonmaterial motivations and resources
affect collective action. The frame-analytic perspective can help us understand
the socially mediated process through which preferences and collective-action
strategies are developed. It can therefore offer us richer accounts of both the
A2K mobilization and the mobilization of IP industries.
i. Frame Mobilization in IP Industries
Can the recent increase in IP protection both locally and globally really be
explained as the direct product of the rents associated with exclusive rights
regimes, as the broadest public choice accounts suggest? A closer examination
indicates not. In their account of the recent strengthening of copyright law,
William Landes and Richard Posner point to a gap in the logic of public choice
theories: if IP laws invariably create rent-seeking pressures, the public choice
problems associated with IP law are timeless. Why, then, have they suddenly
come to have such a significant effect? Economic models suggest that
information has become more valuable, but this has been a much more gradual
process than the recent shifts in the law.17 To explain the inflection point that
seems to have occurred about thirty years ago, Landes and Posner turn to
influences such as political context and "ideological currents.' ' 76 They cite, for
example, the "[fjree-market ideology" that came to prominence in the late
1970s and argue that "[g]iven the historically and functionally close relation
between markets and property rights, it was natural for free-market ideologists
to favor an expansion of intellectual property rights.' 1 77 They refer to such
forces as the decline of U.S. competitiveness internationally and the decreased
hostility of new Supreme Court nominees and executive agencies to strong IP
rights.' 78 Their conclusion: "political forces and ideological currents ... abetted
by interest-group pressures that favor originators of intellectual property over
copiers, may explain the increases" in copyright protection that we have
stronger IP laws but have ended up with the short end of the stick and changed course. But
to say this is to recognize that industry actors themselves engage in acts of interpretation, in
order to develop theories about business models and legal environments that will advantage
them, and to legitimate and motivate collective action.
175. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 63, at 25.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 22-23.
178. Id. at 24-25.
117:8o04 20o8
THE NEW POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
seen.179 One of the most recent and sophisticated public choice accounts in the
field thus ultimately treats ideology and context, and not material interests, as
the fulcrum of change.
Other scholars have also pointed to the influence of the conceptual realm
when they seek to understand the timing and velocity of recent changes in IP
law. Mark Lemley and William Fisher, for example, argue that the term
"intellectual property" did not come into widespread use in the United States
until the 196os. 8, What we today call IP was once more commonly called
"industrial property" or "monopoly," and many scholars contend that this shift
in terminology itself has helped to legitimate and effectuate the recent
expansion of IP law. ' 1 Most such arguments focus on the purported impact of
the word property, or the "propertization" of intellectual property."' They
point out that it is not obvious that patents, copyright, and trademarks should
be thought of as a species of property. They might instead be treated as a
branch of tort law (for example, through rubrics of unfair competition or
misappropriation), or as a kind of government regulation or subsidy.183 And of
course patent, copyright, and trademark law are quite unlike property law in
many ways.18 4 Others contend that what has changed is less the use of the
179. Id. at 25 (emphasis added).
i8o. See Mark A. Lemley, Romantic Authorship and the Rhetoric of Property, 75 TEX. L. REv. 873,
895 (1997) (book review); Fisher, supra note 63, at 22.
181. See CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL
HISTORY 18 (20o6); Julie E. Cohen, Overcoming Property: Does Copyright Trump Privacy?,
2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 375, 379; Fisher, supra note 63, at 20-23; Lemley, supra note
63, at 1037; Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter
Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 398 (1989);
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-LCAJ.
ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 35, 51-52 (1998).
is8. Fisher, supra note 63, at 22 ("[T]he use of the term 'property' to describe copyrights,
patents, trademarks, etc. conveys the impression that they are fundamentally 'like' interests
in land or tangible personal property -and should be protected with the same generous
panoply of remedies."); see also Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Public Domain of Science:
Has the Time for an Experimental Use Defense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. L. REv. 457, 465 (2004)
(calling the trend "Locke Jaw"); Lemley, supra note 63, at 1033 (arguing that property
rhetoric has led courts to "jump from the idea that intellectual property is property to the
idea that the IP owner is entitled to capture the full social value of her right," although this
makes little economic sense where the good in question is informational).
183. See Lemley, supra note 63, at lO69-75; Stewart E. Sterk, Intellectualizing Property: The
Tenuous Connections Between Land and Copyright, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 417 (2005).
184. Patents and copyrights are limited to a fixed number of years, and all three forms of IP law
have numerous exceptions that have no analogues in property law. See Sterk, supra note 183.
The fact that information is nonrivalrous and an input as well as an output of its own
production process also leads to fundamentally different economic dilemmas than those that
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word "property" in relation to immaterial goods, but the "use of the
combination of the words 'intellectual' and 'property' as a catch-all phrase to
denote a large variety of disparate rights - in other words, the 'intellectualizing'
of property."'8 s Scholars have thus pointed to several areas in which ideas and
acts of interpretation may affect the structure of IP law, but there has been as
yet no systematic attempt to link these insights together and incorporate them
into our accounts of the political economy of the field. To develop such an
account, we must return to the framing theories described in Part I.
The insights of framing theory are rarely applied to corporate actors,
perhaps because they are usually excluded by definition from the social
movements that framing theorists usually study. 8 6 I apply the paradigm here
not to suggest that the IP industries constitute a social movement, but to call
attention to the processes of interpretation that industry actors must engage in
before they act, and particularly before they act collectively. Even corporate
interests are not invariably fixed and given. As importantly, corporate actors'
theories about how such interests can be advanced (diagnoses and prognoses,
in frame-analytic terms) are subject to the usual set of interpretive difficulties
that framing theorists describe. 8' That does not mean that the assumptions of
public choice theory-that actors have fixed interests and are able to ascertain
with a high degree of certainty how to advance them -are not useful in some
settings and at some times. In fact, these assumptions frequently may be
adequate for describing institutionalized actors in settled times; framing
obtain in the real property context. See Lemley, supra note 63, at 1037 (describing, for
example, the misfit of the concept of the "tragedy of the commons" in the informational
domain). Many of the suppositions that govern the economics of property in land, and that
are often used to justify the contours of real property law, might therefore not apply when
the good in question is informational. For more on this argument, see id. See also LANDES &
POSNER, supra note 63, at 23.
185. Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 4.
186. See supra note 2. Some social movement theorists also suggest that framing processes are
less important in institutionalized settings. MCADAM, supra note 2, at xxi (arguing that the
"continuous processes of sense-making and collective attribution are arguably more
important in movements insofar as the latter require participants to reject institutionalized
routines and taken for granted assumptions about the world and to fashion new world
views and lines of interaction"). In my view, elite contention and struggle by and between
dominant groups, not only popular contention, see supra note 2, can involve such acts of
radical reinterpretation. Arguably, the TRIPS agreement is itself an example of the rejection
of "institutionalized routines and taken for granted assumptions," in favor of the then-
radical claim that intellectual property is trade related.
187. See, e.g., Snow et al., Micromobilization, supra note io, at 466 n.7 (noting that "interpretation
is a problematic enterprise that can be encumbered by intentional deception, incomplete
information, stereotypic beliefs, disputes between allegedly 'authoritative' interpreters, and
so on").
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processes may be in turn more salient and important at times of ideational and
environmental uncertainty.' 8 The digital networked economy has evolved at
breakneck pace, and IP law alongside it. This may be a good example of the
kind of unsettled context in which interests and interpretations are
unpredictable, even in the most institutionalized and materially oriented
sectors. Material interests and aims are not just properties of social actors;
rather, they arise out of social processes mediated by collective understandings.
Consider an example. Businesses have available to them many different
theories of how they might profit from the production of information. IP
rights are one such system; publicly financed prizes and grants are another.'8 9
An IP strategy requires significant up-front investments and unpredictability at
the back end and raises the price of informational inputs as well as outputs.' 9°
IP rights can also be very expensive to enforce; the government "trough" might
in some circumstances be viewed as a more secure source of funds than the
market, and of course is also a possible target of rent seeking.' 9 ' One classic
criticism of provisioning programs derives precisely from the possibility of
rent-seeking and capture that they generate.' 92 The point is not that IP is not
the best way for a particular industry to obtain the greatest rents, but that
whether this is so may at times be difficult to tell objectively, and contingent on
contextual factors. It will depend not only on complex judgments about
economics, but also on the likelihood that one frame or another will resonate
with allies and bystanders.
The broadest public choice claim, that IP rents themselves will invariably
lead to strong demands for more IP, is perhaps best understood as a powerful
descriptive account of a particular historical moment, one that has been
s8. MCADAM, supra note 2, at xxiv, xxvi.
18q. Paul A. David, Intellectual Property Institutions and the Panda's Thumb: Patents, Copyrights, and
Trade Secrets in Economic Theory and History, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 19, 29 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein, Mary Ellen
Mogee & Roberta A. Schoen eds., 1993).
19o. See Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTITvrY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-15
(Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).
191. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, PUBLIC GOODS, REDISTRIBUTION AND RENT SEEKING (2005);
George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 4-5
(1971); see also JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 283-
95 (1962) (discussing the relationship between special interest groups and governmental
economic activity).
192. Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 QJ. ECON.
1137, 1139 (1998); Fred Smith, Governmental Research Funding and Economic Distortion,
KNOWLEDGE, TECH. & POL'Y, Fall 1998, at 27, 28.
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conditioned by many more influences than opportunities for rents. As Landes
and Posner point out, IP - unlike strategies of patronage or prize funds - was a
good fit with the "ideological currents" of the 198os.' 9 3 A self-interested
business in the 198os might well have made assumptions about the state,
markets, and property rights- operating with the "free market" frame, for
example-in ways that affected not only what it could achieve through the
political process, but also what it could understand as its own interests. In
other words, the imperative of interpretation affects the corporate sector too,
and corporate collective action is thus necessarily shaped by interpretive
choices that are influenced by preexisting discursive opportunities and
structures.
Such everyday interpretative frames become collective-action frames in the
sociological sense when they are used to foster, sustain, or legitimate collective
action. 94 As described above, the term "intellectual property" has been very
much "in vogue" in recent years.'95 One reason may be that the term provides a
collective-action frame for industry groups, one that unifies a disparate set of
industries and at the same time capitalizes on the positive associations that
come with the concept of "property." The popularity of the term "intellectual
property," that is, may not simply affect policymakers and judges, or be
"evidence" that such decision makers are treating IP more like property. 196 It
may also be evidence of a process of dialogic framing.' 97
The term "intellectual property" appears to do several different kinds of
framing work. As scholars such as Lemley and Fisher have emphasized, the
term conceptually links regimes like copyright and patent law with the strong
rights of exclusion and cultural legitimacy associated with real property law.
Justin Hughes has recently demonstrated, however, that regular references to
copyright as "property" or "literary property," and to patents as "industrial
property," reach back to the nineteenth century, and that the word "property"
193. See LANDES &POSNER, supra note 63, at 24-25.
194. See Snow, Discursive Fields, supra note io, at 385.
195. See Lemley, supra note 63, at 1033.
196. See Justin Hughes, Copyright and Incomplete Historiographies: Of Piracy, Propertization, and
Thomas Jefferson, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 993, 1003 (2006) (arguing that these are the two
primary arguments that scholars have emphasized to date).
197. Cf Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy To Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File
Sharing, 17 HARv. J.L. &TEcH. 1, 22 (2003) (noting that "[t]he copyright industries regularly
employ the rhetoric of private property to support their lobbying efforts and litigation" and
citing examples); Sterk, supra note 183, at 420 ("One might surmise then, that introduction
of the property label into copyright and patent was not accidental.").
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figured in the original title and text of the Statute of Anne.198 "Even if
'intellectual property' was a recent concept," he contends, "no one has provided
a serious explanation of how 'intellectual property' leads to the propertization
of copyright in a way that 'property' and 'literary property' did not in the
eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries. " "'
Framing theory may provide us with such an explanation. For one,
concepts of property have of course themselves changed over time, providing
different resonance today than in earlier years.2"' A second explanation turns
precisely on the "intellectualization" of property, a trend that Hughes does not
dispute. The term "intellectual property," that is, constructs a diverse group of
industries as having common interests. Framing theory also suggests that the
term facilitates alliances between these groups, and helps them appeal to a
broader cohort of contiguous groups and bystanders. The frame builds a
bridge between patent and copyright, perhaps permitting copyright industries
to draft off of the arguments that the pharmaceutical industry makes about the
importance of exclusive rights to innovation. Similarly, it may permit patent-
based industries to benefit from arguments about piracy and the breakdown of
law that copyright owners make. (Of course, each member of this newly
framed group is also rendered vulnerable to the attacks made on their new
allies.)
The importance of collective-action frames for industry actors is
particularly apparent in the international realm. The TRIPS agreement is
widely attributed to the efforts of a very small number of industry leaders in
the United States who came together to articulate a common interest and
persuade the legislative and executive branches that IP protection was crucial to
the balance of trade in the United States."0 But as analysts of the process have
shown, the alliance itself was not a foregone conclusion; industry groups had
to create a new trade committee in order to create a common agenda that
would unite Hollywood producers, publishing interests, the software sector,
198. See Hughes, supra note 196, at ioo8, 1012-13.
199. Id. at 997.
2oo. Lemley argues that the term "intellectual property" draws on one particular recent theory of
property that has emerged from law and economics scholarship, which "emphasizes the
importance of private ownership as the solution to the economic problem known as the
,tragedy of the commons,'" and urges that private property is essential for efficient
allocation of resources because it aligns "private and social costs and benefits." Lemley, supra
note 63, at 1037, 1039-40.
201. See PETER DRAHos & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, INFORMATION FEUDALISM: WHO OWNS THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY (2002); SELL, supra note 91, at 98-99.
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industrial manufacturers, and the chemical and pharmaceutical industries." 2
Participants initially understood themselves as "strange bedfellows" and had
significant disagreements about strategy.2"3 Part of how they united and gained
the support of policymakers was by forging a common identity as intellectual
property industries, and by framing the use of their products without
permission as "theft." ' 4
The industry lobby was "particularly effective in translating their private
interests into a matter of public interest," for example by "packag[ing] its
demands as a solution to America's trade woes" and "appeal[ing] to America's
long-standing free trade ethos." ' It made the case that TRIPS was not only
good for American business, but also good for global innovation, and for
developing countries specifically." 6 Although there were undoubtedly many
factors that worked to produce the acquiescence of developing countries,"20
those who have studied it have concluded that the success of TRIPS required
not just pressure and transfer payments, but also interventions in the realm of
ideas." 8
2z. See SELL, supra note 91, at 103.
203. See id.
204. DRAHOS & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 201, at 61, 118-19, 122-23, 132; SELL, supra note 91, at 12-
13; Peter Drahos, Global Property Rights in Information: The Story of TRIPS at the GATT, 13
PROMETHEUS 1, 12-13 (1995).
205. SELL, supra note 91, at 99, 1OO.
2o6. See, e.g., J. Hearing of the Subcomm. on Intellectual Property and Judicial Administration of the
H. Comm. on the Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 1o3d Cong. 297-98 (1994) (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff,
President, Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America); see also SELL, supra note
91, at 55 ("The private sector's normative power was consolidated and institutionalized in so
far as it 'elevated its own self-interest to the status of a substantive norm' and established
'understandings about what is proper, natural and legitimate' that reflected 'the interests of
the big corporate players."' (citation omitted)); Drahos, supra note 204, at 15 ("[A] s novices,
[some developing countries] were subject to the disciplining effect of expert knowledge.
Negotiators from the developed world were almost always in a position to be able to 'pull
rank' in terms of technical expertise.").
207. See SELL, supra note 91, at i1o.
2o8. DuTFIELD, supra note 65, at 2o; SELL, supra note 91, at 10o. Coercion alone would, for
example, have undermined the desire of northern countries to create a stable multilateral
trading system. Drahos, supra note 204, at 12. Drahos also suggests that the ideas and
expertise mobilized around TRIPS had their desired effect. He found in his interviews, for
example, that
senior policy makers from many countries expressed support for the globalization
of intellectual property, even though their own country was a net intellectual
property importer and could, in all probability, never hope to be a net exporter.
When confronted by their status as net importers, they could offer no real
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Some might contend that frames are merely epiphenomenal expressions of
material conditions. But as the preceding examples indicate, framing processes
can themselves affect material circumstances and outcomes. As Landes and
Posner show, framing processes may sometimes define "tipping points" and
thus affect outcomes in a political contest. Frames can thus themselves be
thought of as contextual resources. But they are also resources that are not fully
in the control of those who seek to use them. Rather, they set up chains of
argument and counterargument that are difficult to predict a priori.
For example, when a coalition of industry groups promoted TRIPS as an
agreement that would promote development, they may have paved the way for
the agreement's adoption, but they also paved the way for a critique of that
argument (and thus of TRIPS) by developing countries and A2K advocates.
Similarly, the industry attack on "pirates" who steal intellectual property has
been inverted into an attack on industry "biopirates" who "steal" traditional
knowledge and genetic resources.2 9 Arguments about the importance of
copyright to innovation have been contested by showing that an extension to
an already long copyright term adds only a miniscule amount to the incentive
effect of the original term.2"' The argument that exclusive rights are essential to
sustaining innovation in software has been undermined by scholars who
chronicle the success of free and open-source software." '
The frames that are chosen to advance a particular political claim can thus
be challenged in ways that can help turn back the gains of a group. Frames can
also shape the framer's response to a counterattack. Consider the coevolution
of TRIPS and the access-to-medicines campaign. When seeking to legitimate
TRIPS, representatives of the pharmaceutical industry argued that the
agreement, and strong patent rights, were good for developing countries."'
When the access-to-medicines campaign drew attention to the price
implications of patents in developing countries and the extremity of the AIDS
crisis, the industry responded in several ways, all of which continued to operate
within the initial frame that insisted on the importance of medicines to
justification for their belief, except to suggest that, perhaps one day, they would be
exporters.
Peter Drahos, Thinking Strategically About Intellectual Property Rights, 21 TELECOMM. POL'Y
201, 206-07 (1997) (footnote omitted).
209. VANDANA SHIVA, PROTECT OR PLUNDER? UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
49 (2O01).
21o. Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. oi-6i8).
211. See, e.g., Benkler, supra note 121.
212. See supra note 206 and accompanying text.
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
developing countries. They first offered limited drug donation programs and
argued that lack of medical infrastructure was a much more important barrier
to access than patents.213 This strategy largely failed.1 4 Companies then
lowered prices more significantly, to what they said were "no profit" prices in
some countries '. 2 " These offers were also criticized, with advocates claiming
that the reductions were not steep enough and the programs were too
bureaucratic and limited.1 6 Eventually, companies began issuing limited
licenses to generic suppliers21 7 - the very same move that a few years earlier
they had adamantly resisted.
Around the same time, the access-to-medicines campaign took an
interesting turn, one perhaps influenced, and at least facilitated, by the frames
set forth by their opponents. In order to counter companies' arguments that
strong patents are necessary for R&D in poor countries, medicines
campaigners collected evidence that roughly ninety percent of the world's R&D
funds went to diseases that cause only ten percent of the world's disease
burden, and that this state of affairs was a predictable result of the small
market share that the world's poor represent.2"5 They also created new
organizations specifically to stimulate R&D for neglected diseases. 9
Encountering and seeking to discredit the companies' "innovation frame" thus
seems to have helped direct the access-to-medicines campaign toward new
initiatives and advocacy around R&D. In response, drug companies that had
213. See Helene Cooper, Rachel Zimmerman & Lauren McGinley, Patents Pending: AIDS
Epidemic Traps Drug Firms in a Vise, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at Ai; Michael Waldholz,
Bristol-Myers Heeds Calls To Bolster War Against HIV in Africa, WALL. ST. J., May 6, 1999, at
Al.
214. See Cooper et al., supra note 213.
215. Mark Schoofs & Michael Waldholz, AIDS-Drug Price War Breaks Out in Africa, Goaded by
Generics, WAUL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2001, at Al; Rachel Zimmerman & Michael Waldholz, Abbott
To Cut African AIDS-Drug Prices, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 2001, at A3.
216. Schoofs & Waldholz, supra note 215; Zimmerman & Waldholz, supra note 215.
217. Bristol-Myers Squibb Seeks To Expand Access to HIV/AIDS Medicine, PHARMA Bus. WK., Mar.
20, 2006, at 89.
218. See GLOBAL FORUM FOR HEALTH RESEARCH, THE 1O/9O REPORT ON HEALTH RESEARCH 2003-
2004 (2004); Patrice Trouiller et al., Drug Development for Neglected Diseases: A Deficient
Market and a Public-Health Policy Failure, 359 LANCET 2188, 2189-90 (2002). Several of the
authors of this oft-cited Lancet paper worked for M~decins Sans Fronti~res [Doctors
Without Borders] and have been involved in the access-to-medicines campaign. See id. at
2188.
219. See Drugs for Neglected Diseases Initiative, Home Page, http://www.dndi.org/ (last visited
Nov. 2, 2007).
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historically spent very little on neglected diseases began to invest much more in
charitable attempts to develop medicines for neglected diseases.220
Paradoxically, pharmaceutical companies may have set the stage for a new
moment of global consciousness about the medical needs of developing nations
when they framed their arguments for strong global patent rights in terms that
trumpeted the importance of access to medicines for all people. As the access-
to-medicines campaign unfurled, the process of argument and
counterargument followed a path enabled (though not determined) by the
arguments made by companies. The claims of activists forced companies to
reduce prices, grant licenses, and allocate resources to R&D to bolster their
claim that strong patent rights were not inconsistent with access to medicines
and R&D for the poor. Had the conditions of the political culture of the time
permitted companies to defend TRIPS with regard to a different claim -say, as
an agreement that concentrated R&D resources in the wealthiest countries and
that extracted maximum resources from developing countries -then different
responses would have been possible and different material outcomes would
have resulted.
2. Frame Mobilization in AK
The existence and success of the AK mobilization likewise requires us to
understand not just material interests, but how people collectively construct
their sense of interests and opportunities, and how acts of framing can help
groups to build support, recruit allies, and exert political leverage.
Many of those involved in the AK mobilization have acute material stakes
in calling for changes in IP laws. Arcane aspects of patent law can be
understood to affect the lives of people with AIDS in South Africa in a
22o. Mary Moran, A Breakthrough in R&D for Neglected Diseases: New Ways To Get the Drugs We
Need, 2 PLoS MED. 0828, 0829 (2005) (noting that as of 2005, companies were providing
half of all new neglected disease research and doing so on a "non-commercial basis"). As
Moran notes, the landscape for development of drugs for neglected diseases "changed
dramatically" from 2000 to 2005. Id. at 0828. This "activity-at a level unheard of in the past
two decades -commenced largely in the absence of significant new government incentives
and generally without public intervention" and was funded significantly by philanthropic
groups, and to a smaller extent by industry actors. Id. at 0829. Moran concludes that
companies' new interest in neglected diseases is "not motivated by commercial returns in
the neglected-disease market, but rather by ... the risk to [the companies'] reputation
stemming from growing public pressure on companies over their failure to address
developing country needs [and] corporate social responsibility and ethical concerns," as well
as instrumental desires suchas the wish to build "access to low-cost, high-skilled developing
country researchers." Id.
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profoundly immediate way, for example. But even this fact, the frame-analytic
perspective tells us, requires an act of interpretation before it can be the basis of
political mobilization. In South Africa, for example, high government officials
responded to the AIDS crisis and the high price of patented medicines not in an
anti-IP frame, but in an "AIDS denialist" frame.' Other interpretations are
possible, including the one offered by drug companies: that AIDS drugs are
sophisticated and that their high cost represents their "true" price, when the
massive expenditures and risk required for their development are considered.
Why then did so many AIDS patients and access-to-medicines campaigners
focus on IP as a problem and on international trade rules and companies as the
proper register in which to respond? Posing this question helps to elucidate a
broader point: the recent politicization of IP was not inevitable, even for those
most directly and materially affected by strong IP laws. Rather, it is the result
of movement-building dynamics that have their roots in intersections between
expanding IP law and emergent frameworks of antiglobalization, human
rights, environmentalism, and cyberutopianism.
The access-to-medicines campaign, for example, both understood and built
claims against strong patent laws through frameworks of international human
rights discourse and corporate malfeasance.222 Farmers' rights advocates tapped
into environmental frameworks and the antiglobalization movement. 3 The
221. They argued, that is, that HJV does not cause AIDS, that HIV/AIDS drugs are toxic, and
that such drugs are in fact a possible cause of AIDS itself. This denialist frame, as it has
emerged in South Africa, includes diagnostic and prognostic elements: it posits a racist
conspiracy promoted in part by multinational drug companies, argues that AIDS is in fact
caused by factors such as poverty, and urges that antipoverty campaigns are the best
medicine for AIDS. See generally Mandisa Mbali, AIDS Discourses and the South African State:
Government Denialism and Post-Apartheid AIDS Policy-Making, 54 TRANSFORMATION 104
(2004); Adam Sitze, Denialism, 103 S. ATLANTIC Q 769 (2004). The discourse of AIDS
denialism emerged initially in the United States, but as Mandisa Mbali has shown, "unlike
AIDS dissidence internationally, the South African version of denialism espoused by Mbeki
and other high profile government officials has been obsessed with colonial and late
apartheid discourses of race, sexuality and disease in Africa." Mbali, supra, at 104. It is in
relation to these latter frames, and not an anti-IP frame, that these officials interpreted the
AIDS crisis and responded to (by rejecting) calls for access to medicines.
222t. For example, the declaration accompanying what was perhaps the first global demonstration
for access to HIV/AIDS treatment begins: "We are united with a single purpose, to ensure
that everyone with HIV and AIDS has access to fundamental rights of healthcare and access
to life-sustaining medicines." XIII International AIDS Conference, Global Manifesto (July
9, 2000), http://www.actupny.org/reports/durban-access.html. The movement also draws
upon themes of corporate greed. See id.; see also Eric Sawyer, An ACT LIP Founder "Acts Up"
for Africa's Access to AIDS, in FROM ACT UP TO THE WTO, supra note 174, at 88, 98-101.
223. See, e.g., SHIVA, supra note 209, at 6 (arguing that "[p]atents for living organisms
impoverish human society ethically, ecologically and economically," and bring "commercial
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open-source and Creative Commons movements have drawn upon conceptions
of the freedom of cyberspace and the abundance of the digital age.2 4 All of
these frameworks both helped orient these groups toward an understanding of
IP as a problem and build bridges to others who might support their cause.
Access-to-medicines campaigners could use the human rights frame to
create connections with human rights organizations and institutions in Geneva
and New York.2 Farmers' rights campaigners' arguments about sustainable
development linked them to environmental groups." 6 Claims for protection of
traditional knowledge were framed in a way that drew connections to
indigenous rights claims. Thus, each of these groups mobilized frames that
made certain alliances and political arguments possible.
But these acts of framing also made other alliances more difficult-
including some of the alliances that are beginning to emerge under the rubric
of AK. AIDS activists, for example, have drawn on humanitarian and human
rights frames to argue that medicines are "essential" and categorically more
important than cultural goods like "Barbie dolls or CDs."2"7 Farmers' rights
groups often take strong stances against genetically modified organisms, in
conflict with those who argue for open-source biotechnology on the grounds
that it will allow scientists to engineer new products for poor farmers." 8 To the
extent that groups concerned with farmers' rights and traditional knowledge
draw upon antitechnological discourses, this creates obvious possibilities for
gains to a handful for corporations"). For a description of the actors and themes that
constitute the antiglobalization movement, see PAUL KINGSNORTH, ONE No, MANY YESES
(2003). As Kingsnorth notes, Shiva is perceived as a significant force in that movement. Id.
at 227.
224. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace (Feb. 8,
1996), http://homes.eff.org/-barlow/Declaration-Final.html; Eben Moglen, Anarchism
Triumphant: Free Software and the Death of Copyright, FIRST MONDAY, Aug. 1999,
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue4_8/moglen/index.html.
225. See Access to Medication in the Context of Pandemics Such as HJV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and
Malaria, U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights Res. 2003/29, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/2003/29
(Apr. 22, 2003); Human Rights Watch, The FTAA, Access to HIV/AIDS Treatment, and
Human Rights, A Human Rights Watch Briefing Paper (Oct. 29, 2002),
http ://www.hrw.org/press/2002/1o/ftaalO29-bck.htm.
226. See, e.g., Press Release, Greenpeace, CBD Must Maintain Moratorium on Terminator
Technologies (Mar. 22, 2006), http://mailman.greenpeace.org/pipermaiVpress-releases/
20o6-March/ooo2o9.html (arguing that "terminator technologies" "threaten[] biodiversity,
farmers' rights and the environment").
227. See MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES [DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS], A MATTER OF LIFE AND
DEATH: THE ROLE OF PATENTS IN ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL MEDICINES 1 (2001), available at
http://www.msf.org/source/pdf/2ool/dohacol.pdf.
228. See, e.g., Carina Dennis, Biologists Launch "Open-Source Movement," 431 NATURE 494 (2004).
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conflict with those advocates of free and open-source software who see in new
digital technologies a revolution in the making.229
How and why, then, did groups working with such different frames build
bridges to one another? As the next Part argues, these groups are being
brought together through an encounter with IP law itself, operating here both
as a form of constraint and as a field of meaning. Law has provided these
groups with a frame -that of "intellectual property" -that encourages them to
understand themselves as having similar problems and interests, and that
facilitates joint countermobilization against the "IP industries." This is, of
course, somewhat ironic, given the purported power of the concept of IP to
promote the agenda of rights holders. The paradoxical implication here is that
the consolidation of the concept of intellectual property also created a scaffold
for the creation of a broad countermovement. This comports with one of the
central insights of dialogic framing theory, that groups borrow discourses from
their opponents. It also suggests that successful acts of framing can help to
consolidate ground for opposition as well as advance the framer's cause.
IP is the broad frame that is bringing these groups together. But these
groups are also making use of narrower frames to create common arguments
criticizing the existing IP system and to create a sense of themselves as related.
At a recent conference, for example, a key actor in the A2K mobilization, James
Love (of the NGO Knowledge Ecology International), offered the following list
of terms that align the groups in question and that distinguish them from the
IP industries23°:
229. See, e.g., Eben Moglen, The dotCommunist Manifesto Oan. 2003), http://moglen.law
.columbia.edu/publications/dcm.pdf.
230. James Love, Presentation at the Politics and Ideology of Intellectual Property Conference:
Rhetoric and Ideology-IP and the Knowledge Commons (Mar. 20, 2006) (on file with
author).
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PIRACY OF THE COMMONS NEW BUSINESS MODELS
As these tables suggest, A2K groups are actively and self-consciously
creating new concepts in order to construct their interests as related. Frames of
the "information commons" and the "public domain," for example, are at the
heart of the A2K mobilization. The most common definition of the public
domain is the realm of "'IP-free resources,"' unprotected either because they
were ineligible for protection in the first place or because they have been
"freed" by invalidation or expiry of the relevant IP right.23' The first scholarly
call to recognize something called the public domain came in 1981, but the term
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did not come into broader academic usage until much more recently." 2 It has
since become a central frame for the A2K mobilization (although not always
uncontroversially) 33 James Boyle explained why: "We need a change in the
way that these [IP] issues are understood, a change that transforms even our
perceptions of self-interest, making possible coalitions where none existed
before."""4 This could be done, he suggested, through the development of
"affirmative arguments for the public domain" and the "use of the language of
the commons to defend the possibility of distributed methods of non-
proprietary production." 3 "Like the environment," Boyle contended, "the
public domain must be 'invented' before it is saved.23
6
The concept of the "commons" had to be invented in much the same way,
drawing on the notion of the commons as a historical concept in real property
232. See id. at 786 (describing the "pioneer[ing]" work of David Lange, Recognizing the Public
Domain, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1981, at 147). For important early work on the
public domain, see Lange, supra; and Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMORY L.J. 965
(199o). See also L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A
LAW OF USERS' RIGHTS (1991); Samuelson, supra note 181; Diane Leenheen Zimmerman,
Information as Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of
Rights, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 665 (1992). For more recent work, see generally DAVID
BOLLIER, WHY THE PuBLIc DOMAIN MATTERS: THE ENDANGERED WELLSPRING OF
CREATIVITY, COMMERCE AND DEMOCRACY (2002); David Lange, Reimagining the Public
Domain, LAw & CONTEMp. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 463; Pamela Samuelson,
Mapping the Digital Public Domain: Threats and Opportunities, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
Winter/Spring 2003, at 147; and Pamela Samuelson, Preserving the Positive Functions of the
Public Domain in Science, 2 DATA Sci. J. 192 (2003). As Samuelson notes,
The sparseness of legal commentary on the public domain until very recently is
somewhat surprising given that many judicial opinions had discussed the public
domain as the status of informational works following expiration or invalidation of
intellectual property rights (IPRs) or as the consequence of a claimant's failure to
satisfy substantive or procedural requirements for intellectual property protection.
Samuelson, supra note 231, at 786. The copyright statute referred to the public domain as far
back as 19o9. See Copyright Act of 19o9, ch. 320, § 7, 35 Stat. 1075, io77, superseded by Act of
July 30, 1947, ch. 391, 61 Stat. 652 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. (2000)). I thank Pam
Samuelson for this point.
233. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 CAL. L. REV.
1331, 1335 (2004) (criticizing the concept of the public domain as hostile to the claims to
property that indigenous groups may deserve).
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law, and adapting it to the nonrival domain of information in order to combat
the frame of the "tragedy of the commons."23 As Boyle describes it:
Increasingly, intellectual property scholars and information economists
have turned to the theorists of the commons in trying to understand
innovation.... In the debates over intellectual property policy, we have
been familiar with a conceptual scheme that portrays "intellectual
property" as a monopoly, and "the public domain," as its conceptual
opposite-a realm of vaguely defined "freedom." In contrast, the
commons literature gives us a conceptual scheme in which property,
seen as a regime of individual, legal, market-based control is juxtaposed
to its conceptual opposite-the well-run commons, a realm of
collective, and sometimes informal, controls that avoids the tragedy of
the commons without a need for single party ownership. The former
juxtaposes monopolies against freedom, the latter juxtaposes individual
formal controls against collective, and often informal, ones. Both give
us a realm of property and a realm in which its opposite, or alternative,
are offered.238
Boyle thus illustrates the power of collective-action frames to combat, and
possibly overcome, what might at first appear to be insurmountable public
choice problems. Acts of framing can create a sense of commonality between
people who previously understood themselves as unrelated. They can also
render interests that are diffuse suddenly salient, particularly once we
incorporate nonmaterial interests into our theories of action.
Savvy acts of framing can also help groups recruit support for their cause.
Love's Tables illustrate the framing struggle between IP and A2K activists,
with IP proponents mobilizing terms such as "piracy" and "theft," and the A2K
237. For important early work elaborating the concept of the information commons, see Yochai
Benkler, Overcoming Agoraphobia: Building the Commons of the Digitally Networked
Environment, ii HARv. J.L. & TECH. 287, 298-319 (1998); Benkler, supra note 64; and Yochai
Benkler, Property, Commons, and the First Amendment: Towards a Core Common
Infrastructure (Mar. 2001) (white paper for the First Amendment Program, Brennan Center
for Justice at NYU Law School), available at http://www.benkler.org/WhitePaper.pdf;
LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED
WORLD (2001). See also Lawrence Lessig, Keynote Address: Commons and Code, 9 FoRDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 405 (1999). See generally Margaret Chon, Postmodern
"Progress": Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97 (1993); Peter
A. Jaszi, Goodbye to All That-A Reluctant (and Perhaps Premature) Adieu to a Constitutionally-
Grounded Discourse of Public Interest in Copyright Law, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 595 (1996).
238. James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring
2003, at 1, 8 (footnote omitted).
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mobilization countering with arguments about "sharing," "freedom," and
"access." Thus, we can also see how A2K activists are seeking to build collective
frames that resonate across their different issue areas and that supplement their
issue-specific frames of, for example, environmentalism and peer-to-peer
production. In other words, the most pessimistic public choice accounts of the
tectonics of this area of law do not reckon with the mediating power of frames.
As framing theorists point out, the "passage from condition to [political]
action is a contingent and open process mediated by a number of conjectural
and structural factors." '239 The A2K and IP mobilizations are both illustrations
of this fact. (This is not to say that the A2K movement will necessarily continue
to enjoy success, or even that it will continue to mobilize through the same
rubric and frames. Nor is it to suggest that industry groups' significant
material advantages will not give them disproportionate influence in the
political arena. Rather, it is to draw attention to the mediating role of framing
processes and to the contingent acts of meaning making that have facilitated
the emergence of both mobilizations.)
We can also find in the A2K mobilization many illustrations of the fact that
frames are not simply epiphenomenal. Concepts of framing, for example, help
explain the rapid proliferation of open-licensing schemes across the A2K
mobilization. As critics point out, there may be vast differences in the material
realms in which these licenses are being employed, and it is not obvious that
they will work in the realm of copyright or biotechnology as they do in the
realm of software. 4° But as groups have been drawn together through their
encounter with law into an "A2K" frame, they are trying these strategies,
perhaps as a form of solidarity or because they believe that their problems are
related.
Frames also matter because they can help determine who occupies and is
linked to a particular mobilization. The A2K mobilization, as noted above, has
seized on concepts of the "public domain" and the "commons" as themes that
unify groups working in different areas of IP and as anchors for arguments
about the damage that strong IP does to public welfare. But this creates tension
239. Canel, supra note 2, at 190.
240. See, e.g., David W. Opderbeck, The Penguin's Genome, or Coase and Open Source
Biotechnology, 18 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 167, 181-200 (2004) (contending that the open-source
paradigm does not translate well into the biotechnology domain). The GPL, of course, has
been used as a model for a myriad of other private ordering schemes, such as Creative
Commons licenses, open genomics licenses, and licenses to promote access to public sector
research. See Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing
Approach for University Innovations, 2o BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, lO69-72 (2005); see also
supra text accompanying notes 144, 147.
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with some groups that have contributed to the growing critique of IP -most
evidently, those that argue for protection of traditional knowledge. 4' There
are, of course, many different ways of conceptualizing the claim for protection
of traditional knowledge, some more and some less in tension with a call for
open access and the protection of a public domain. 42 But as participants in the
effort to build an A2K movement have pointed out, tensions between advocates
of openness and advocates for protection of traditional knowledge may create a
cleavage in what is currently a fragile coalition. 3 This fissure would, in a very
material sense, be attributable to framing choices made by movement actors.
III. THE GRAVITATIONAL PULL OF LAW ON FRAMING PROCESSES
The previous Part shows that A2K groups have relied on acts of framing to
create connections to one another, to develop a theory of their shared interests
and claims, and to create resonance with bystander publics. It also
demonstrates that the A2K mobilization has succeeded in influencing IP law in
significant ways. Less obvious, however, is how we should understand law to
be influencing this mobilization. The pages that follow describe the central
241. For a recent articulation of this conflict, see Chander & Sunder, supra note 233.
z42. Shubha Ghosh has offered a helpful classification of the three main positions that have
emerged from those debates: the "public domain position," which insists that traditional
knowledge or genetic resources be "shared by all constituencies in a global commons"; the
"moral rights position," which seeks for holders of traditional knowledge "either a complete
ownership interest that would block any claims by actual appropriators and exploiters of the
knowledge or a stake in any commercial exploitation made by multinationals"; and the
"appropriation position," which reflects the U.S. and European IP systems and "supports
exclusive ownership of traditional knowledge with rights vested in that entity that makes
commercial or other practical use of the knowledge." Ghosh, supra note 92, at 79. Advocates
have proposed a wide variety of legal mechanisms to protect traditional knowledge, some of
which would yield strong rights to exclude, and others of which would establish only
"defensive" protection (for example, by codifying traditional knowledge in a public database
to defeat patent claims, or voiding patents that entailed an appropriation of traditional
knowledge without adequate informed consent). See, e.g., CARLos M. CORui.rA, TRADITIONAL
KNOWLEDGE AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 9-19 (2001); GRAHAM DuTFiELD, PROTECTING
TRADITIONAL KNOWLEDGE: PATHWAYS TO THE FUTURE 22-32 (2006), available at
http://www.iprsonline.org/unctadictsd/docs/graham%2ofinal.pdf.
243. Editorial, supra note 140, at 3 (noting that not all may agree on the merits of concepts such
as the "public domain," particularly "if putting seeds in the public domain means that
Monsanto can inject them with Terminator genes to destroy peasant agriculture," and if
groups have different ideas about the ultimate acceptability of property in informational
goods).
24. I focus on this rather than the role of law in shaping the frames used by the pro-IP
mobilization because the A2K mobilization is much less well described and ostensibly more
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role that law has played in the acts of framing that are helping to constitute the
A2K mobilization.
The influence of law on the framing processes of A2K activists illustrates
what I call the "gravitational" force that law can exert on framing processes.
Law is, of course, only one among many resources for framing."45 Nonetheless,
there is good reason to believe that law has a particularly powerful influence on
the meaning-making efforts of movement actors. This follows directly from
law's status as a dual resource (to use Pedriana's term) and from the fact that
"[1]egal practices carry with them their own inherent constraints on what is
accepted as legally sensible or compelling. ,,46 The term "gravitational" is thus
intended to designate something more than the role of law as a "master
frame. 147 It points also to the special form of constraint that legal frames exert
upon those who use them.
From the discursive perspective, of course, all frames are freighted with
preexisting meanings and affordances, and cannot be wielded simply to suit
the aims of an actor. But legal frames are more constrained-more weighty, if
you like -than many because they are imbued with doctrine and history, and
tethered to institutions that are authorized to define and implement the law. If
law attracts movement actors because it is "semantically permeable," in Siegel's
words,' 4' it also directs their arguments because it is semantically constrained.
The term "gravitational" marks this directionality. It is not, however, intended
to figure law as the center of the social universe. Everything with mass exerts a
gravitational pull; the more massive an object, the greater the force.
A crucial caveat is in order. To say that law exerts a gravitational pull on the
framing processes of groups is not the same thing as saying that engagement
with law tends to coopt or deradicalize groups. 49 An exploration of that
surprising than its counterpart. With sufficient time and space, however, it would be
possible to develop an analogous account of the substantive role that law has played in the
framing processes of those who argue for stronger IP rights. Such an analysis might begin
by examining the role that the legal concept of property has played in the pro-IP
mobilization. See supra text accompanying notes 196-200.
245. See Marshall, supra note 37, at 662; McCann, supra note 2, at 23; Pedriana, supra note 12, at
1750.
246. McCann, supra note 2, at 22; cf. Jack M. Balkin, "Wrong the Day It Was Decided": Lochner
and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. L. REv. 677, 711 (2005) (noting that "constitutional
common sense ... allows well-socialized lawyers to recognize what is a better and worse
argument, what is a plausible interpretation of the Constitution and what is 'off-the-wall"').
247. Pedriana, supra note 12.
248. Siegel, supra note 54, at 322.
249. There is, of course, a long-running debate in the law and society literature about whether
movements fall under the sway of legal ideology, or whether they use law when the benefits
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question is beyond the scope of this Article. Importantly, though, the
gravitational and integrative effects that are here discussed are meaningful even
if they do not lead to cooptation in the classic sense because they influence the
path that a movement/countermovement conflict takes. The gravitational pull
that law has exerted on the framing processes of the A2K mobilization has, as I
describe below, affected the group's architecture, discourse, and strategies. It
has also brought it into alignment with its opponents, creating zones of
agreement between A2K groups and their opponents, but also zones of
common disagreement.
This Part concludes by theorizing three possible implications of law's
gravitational pull. If law integrates groups with their opponents,
movement/countermovement conflict can strengthen law even as it unsettles it,
as Siegel has noted. To the extent that movement actors become aware of these
effects, they may be better able to predict and control them, with strategies also
drawn from the frame-analytic perspective. Perhaps most intriguing, however,
are the implications of law's integrative effect in the international domain. If
publics and polities are defined as communities of disagreement, then the case
study offered here suggests that law may have a significant role to play in
creating such communities beyond the nation-state. Analyzing the A2K
mobilization, that is, may help us not only understand the new politics of IP,
but also may help us theorize how new forms of international and
transnational law may facilitate the emergence of global polities and publics.
A. Illustrating the Gravitational Power of Law
The A2K mobilization suggests at least three kinds of effects that law can
have on framing processes, which can be loosely, but usefully, distinguished
from one another. These types and examples are not intended to be exhaustive,
but rather to help begin to specify the different capacities in which law can act
on framing processes. The first effect is architectural; it designates how law can
influence a group's understanding of who its allies and opponents are. The
second and third effects can be called discursive and strategic. As A2K groups
have engaged with law, they have at times modulated their arguments. We can
think of strategic effects as the "thin" version of this, as actors make narrow
interpretive choices in order to capture law's instrumental benefits. Discursive
effects, in contrast, involve more elaborated arguments that groups come more
deeply to inhabit and rework. It may be difficult to draw a sharp delineation
between strategic and discursive effects, but as ideal types they can nonetheless
outweigh the costs and without being overborne by its authority. Compare ScHEINGOD,
supra note 35, with MCCANN, supra note 35.
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be helpful because they designate different levels and types of engagement that
groups may have with substantive legal arguments.
1. Architectural Effects
As some linked to the A2K mobilization themselves have argued, the
concept of "intellectual property" is a "seductive mirage," that generalizes
across domains and laws that work very differently."' Free-software guru
Richard Stallman's well-known plea to abandon the term IP notes, for
example, that
[o]ne issue relating to copyright law is whether music sharing should
be allowed. Patent law has nothing to do with this. Patent law raises
issues such as whether poor countries should be allowed to produce
life-saving drugs and sell them cheaply to save lives. Copyright law has
nothing to do with such matters.2"'
When asked more recently for his view on the potential of a broad coalition of
groups organizing against exclusive rights in information, Stallman made a
similar point: "The various movements are dealing with issues that have little
in common.""'2 The issue with medicines "is simply one of price," he
suggested, while the issue of seeds is one of "freedom to save and exchange
[farmer's] seeds and breed their crops," and the issue for programmers is
"freedom to do what's necessary in order to develop software."5 3
Stallman makes this point in order to denaturalize and discredit the idea of
the "IP industries." It is thus notable that the very same concept provides the
skeleton for the A2K mobilization. As is evident from the issues that they work
on, and the statements of these groups themselves, A2K actors are drawn
together by the recent expansion of IP law and the institutionalization of the
new international IP regime." 4 Despite his skepticism about the wisdom of
25o. See Richard M. Stallman, GNU Project, Did You Say "Intellectual Property"? It's a
Seductive Mirage (Oct. 19, 2007), http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/not-ipr.xhtml.
251. Id.
252. Convergence Panel, Convergence Zone?, SEEDLING, Oct. 2005, at 3, lo, available at
http://www.grain.org/seedlingfiles/seed-o5-io.pdf.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 6 (reporting Beatriz Busaniche's statement that "[ojur common points are the spaces
where we struggle on all the fronts, such as WIPO, the WTO, agreements like TRIPs, free-
trade agreements, etc."); Editorial, supra note 140, at 2 ("In the past few years, the potential
synergy in the battle against patents on seeds and drugs has grown clear, particularly around
the [TRIPS] Agreement....").
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convergence, for example, Stallman argues that "[a]t a broader, more general
level, all these movements ... oppose laws being made to give business more
power. " '2 When asked what links she saw between the various nodes of the
movement, a long-time leader of the access-to-medicines campaign, Ellen 't
Hoen, said, "It is obvious that there is a global backlash against monopoly
rights that have gone too far. ,,, 6 An editorial that calls for the mobilization of
this new movement gives this account:
[T]hey are killing innovation, freedom and access to essential things
like culture, health and education-our innovations, our freedom, our
education. Farmers can't save seeds. Sick people can't afford drugs.
Computer programmers can't modify software. Librarians won't let
you photocopy a magazine article. Students can't afford textbooks.
Why? Because of myriad IPR laws being strengthened every day to stop
you from doing things with someone else's "creative work.""s
In other words, the intersection between these groups, and their efforts to
emerge and work collectively, is located in an identification that is provided
first and foremost by intellectual property law.5' More specifically, these
groups are aligning themselves as skeptics of the recent consolidation and
expansion of IP law in both the domestic and international contexts.
The power of law to act as an architectural force appears formidable from
this perspective, given the divergence between the issue areas and initial
frameworks around which different A2K groups are organized. But we can
understand this process of consolidation through the theories described in Part
I. As social-movement scholars have recently begun to emphasize, groups look
to law as they seek to understand, and also to change, their circumstances." 9
This process in turn shapes groups' sense of their own identities and interests.
The groups that are building connections to one another under the AK rubric
did not start out thinking of themselves as related. But as they evolved and
began making attempts to change law, they adopted new accounts of
themselves. They began to talk about themselves as users of information and as
afflicted by a similar set of problems that could be expressed not only in terms
255. Convergence Panel, supra note 252, at io.
256. Id. at 5.
257. Editorial, supra note 140, at 1.
258. This is evident to others who consider the movement. See, e.g., Schultz & Walker, supra note
125, at 82 (noting that the "New International IP Agenda" is "unified by a common thread of
IP skepticism and a network of [NGOs] and activists").
259. Pedriana, supra note 12, at 1724, 1729.
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of globalization or human rights or freedom, but also in terms of intellectual
property and information economics and structures of innovation. To say that
IP law is the key to the emergence of this new mobilization, therefore, is not
simply to identify the influence of law as a set of restrictions upon freedom. It
is also to identify the power of law to provide groups with frameworks to
understand a particular field of regulation, and how they and others relate to it.
We can call this the "architectural" effect of law on framing processes,
designating the power of legal categories to provide social actors with circuits
through which to connect to other social groups. This corresponds to law's
power to link the fates of different groups through acts of institutional and
logical categorization. When law establishes institutions and substantive rules
of law that apply across groups, it also invites groups affected by these
institutions (for example, WIPO) and rules (for example, "IP law") to think of
themselves as related and perhaps to make common cause. That is because
such groups are mutually affected by the operation of these institutions and
rules (for example, procedural changes at WIPO or substantive changes in the
obviousness standard in patent law).
Of course, this process is dialogic and not fixed or determined in top-down
fashion. Legal architectures do not simply shape social actors, but are also
shaped by them. The existence of agreements like TRIPS and umbrella
institutions such as WIPO, for example, can be explained in part as the product
of coalitions built between industry groups. To offer an example from a
different context, today, the analogy between race and sex is firmly entrenched
in U.S. antidiscrimination law. Decisions about evidentiary standards under
Tide VII or the institutional workings of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission affect a wide variety of overlapping social groups. The analogies
that account for this, however, did not come ready-made in law. The
Fourteenth Amendment and arguments about the nature of invidious
discrimination provided a circuit (or language) through which these
connections could be built, but feminist and antiracist advocates also
consciously constructed analogies between race and sex.26
Architectural decisions have potentially deep implications for advocates.
Just as the analogy between race and sex highlights certain issues and
arguments and downplays others,261 groups in the A2K mobilization implicitly
reject alternative alliances and frameworks when they suture themselves to one
26o. See Serena Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of
Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755 (2004); Serena Mayeri, Note, "A Common Fate of
Discrimination": Race-Gender Analogies in Legal and Historical Perspective, lio YALE L.J. 1045
(2001) [hereinafter Mayeri, Common Fate].
261. Mayeri, Common Fate, supra note 260, at lO86-87.
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another through the rubric of IP. The AK coalition does not, for example,
thematize access to education generally. When it talks about the subject, it is to
stress the importance of educational exceptions in copyright law.262 Similarly,
the mobilization has not focused substantial attention on the need for universal
access to the Internet, but tends instead to raise questions about barriers that
intellectual property may present to the vitality of the Internet as an open
communication medium.263 This did not have to be the case. At times, groups
within the A2K mobilization have sought to generalize along different axes, for
example that of free communication, and different trajectories in the future are
of course possible. 64 But today, the rubric of IP is the one that most powerfully
organizes the mobilization.
2. Discursive Effects
As they engage with law, groups seek to understand and retool the
narratives and arguments that justify and give meaning to law's commands. In
the process, they encounter the arguments of their opponents and often end up
speaking in these same terms. Such effects correspond to law's persuasive and
legitimating force. We can make sense of them if we understand legal
narratives as at the same time constrained and open: groups seeking to
comprehend, challenge, and remake law encounter a field of meaning that
influences them. But groups are drawn into these languages in part because
legal discourses can also be remade and the legitimating effects of legal
z62. See Andrew Rens, Achal Prabhala & Dick Kawooya, Intellectual Property, Education and Access
to Knowledge in Southern Africa 6 tbl.3 , lO-11 (ICTSD, UNCTAD & TRALAC, Working
Paper No. 13, 20o6), available at http://www.tralac.org/pdf/2oo6loo2_Rens
_IntellectualProperty.pdf; see also WiLuAM W. FISHER & WI McGEVERAN, THE
DIGITAL LEARNING CHALLENGE: OBSTACLES TO EDUCATIONAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED
MATERIAL IN THE DIGITAL AGE: A FOUNDATIONAL WHITE PAPER (20o6), available at
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/home/2oo6-o9; A2K Treaty art. 3-1(a)(iii)-(iv), supra note I.
263. See, e.g., A2K Treaty art. 3-5, supra note 1 (incorporating provisions requiring open
standards); see also William New, "Dynamic Coalitions," The New Sword in Internet
Governance Debates, INTELL. PROP. WATCH, Nov. 5, 2006, http://www.ip-watch.org/
weblog/index.php?p=444&res=&res=1280_ff&print=o. The first academic conference
organized around the A2K rubric, organized by the Information Society Project at Yale Law
School, is also a good reference point for tracing the contours of the mobilization. Notably,
the agenda included discussions on peer production in education and network neutrality,
but not on access to education or the Internet more generally. See Access to Knowledge
Conference Agenda (Apr. 21, 2006), available at http://research.yale.edu/isp/eventsa2k.html.
264. See Aviv, supra note 113 (reporting that at the Free Culture movement's first national
conference, speakers presented on topics including "enhancing Internet access in
impoverished countries").
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discourse thus altered or called into question. The following pages offer an
example of how the language of the A2K mobilization has been affected by the
substantive terms in which IP laws are debated and justified. They draw
predominantly on two declarations that members of the A2K mobilization have
collectively produced, the Geneva Declaration on the Future of WIPO and the
Adelphi Charter.26 They show that while the A2K mobilization sometimes
makes claims in the idiom of culture, equality, or human rights, many-and
perhaps most-of its claims are made within the framework of information
economics and the incentive effects of IP systems. A2K advocates have become
deeply enmeshed in arguments about innovation, contesting the dominant
justification for IP law not by rejecting the importance of innovation, but by
offering critiques of the model of innovation that IP law invokes and proposing
projects designed to sustain new and more collaborative forms of innovation.
That is a symptom, I contend, of the A2K mobilization's deep engagement
with IP law and, more specifically, the incentive theory of 1P.
When participants in the A2K mobilization seek to frame arguments and
mobilize support, they sometimes make claims that sound in discourses of
fundamental rights and values. The Geneva Declaration, for example, asserts
that the current IP system is causing harm to "development, diversity, and
democratic institutions, "26 6 and urges WIPO to make efforts to protect
"consumer rights and human rights.''267 The Adelphi Charter declares that
"[h]uman rights call on us to ensure that everyone can create, access, use and
share information and knowledge, enabling individuals, communities and
societies to achieve their full potential" and urges that IP laws "must serve, and
never overturn, the basic human rights to health, education, employment and
cultural life. ,,68 Many more examples can be found across the spectrum of A2K
groups and campaigns. 6 9 As one supporter of the A2K mobilization notes,
265. This is a common method of frame analysis, i.e., using "movement documents, especially
those offered by key movement organizations as position statements." See Hank Johnston,
Comparative Frame Analysis, in FRAMES OF PROTEST: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE FRAMING
PERSPECTIVE, supra note 19, at 24o. As Johnston notes, "[t] he description of these frames is
useful insofar as we accept the presumption that their content is widely shared by
movement participants." Id. The A2K mobilization is so recent that it is difficult to define its
contours precisely. Any selection of key texts is thus contestable, but I contend that the two
used here would be accepted as representative by the majority of those who identify with the
A2K mobilization.
266. Geneva Declaration, supra note 130, at i.
267. Id. at 2.
268. Adelphi Charter, supra note 138.
269. For example, a proposal put forth by the central coalition supporting the development
agenda at WIPO declares that "under no circumstances can human rights-which are
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these conceptual moves are designed to shift the debate into more favorable
conceptual terrain and to "reframe intellectual property as a public health care
issue or a freedom of speech issue, rather than allowing it to be presented as an
indispensable tool of modern economic management."27
References to values of equality and distributive justice are also made
within the AK mobilization. The Geneva Declaration, for example, argues that
the existing system fosters "morally repugnant inequality of access to
education, knowledge and technology [that] undermines development and
social cohesion""27 and is sometimes "brutally unfair."27 2 Again, such claims are
also made by individual A2K groups and campaigns. Advocates for farmers'
rights invoke terms such as "bioserfdom."2 73 Free-software advocates state that
"[w]hat we are fighting ... is a growing monopolisation over knowledge by
major corporations .... These companies can deny others access to knowledge
and the benefits of science. "274 Others object to the substantial wealth transfers
from developing to developed countries that are expected to accompany the
implementation of TRIPS.27s
Yet many A2K claims -particularly in those documents that represent the
most concerted attempt of these groups to make claims together-sound in
languages not of fundamental human rights or distributive justice, but of
information economics, innovation systems, and the need for well-functioning
markets. These latter terms, of course, are those most commonly used to justify
inalienable and universal -be subordinated to intellectual property protection." See WIPO,
Proposal To Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO, 51, WO/IM/1/4 (Apr. 6, 2005),
available at http://www.wsis-pct.org/WIPO/devel-agenda-6apro5.html (reprinting a
proposal by a coalition called the Group of Friends of Development). The copyleft
movement in the United States frequently makes reference to a conflict between copyright
and free speech values, and it has pursued litigation attempting to invalidate expansions of
copyright law by invoking free speech values. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 218
(2003); Golan v. Gonzales, 5O1 F.3d 1179, 1182 (loth Cir. 2007); Kahle v. Gonzales, 487 F.3d
697, 699 (9 th Cir. 2007); see also LESSIG, supra note 115, at 228; Benkler, supra note 64, at
389-9 ° . The access-to-medicines movement often insists that the right to health-must come
before patent rights, asserting, for example, that "[i]ntellectual property is not an
inalienable private right, like life or dignity or adequate health." Mark Heywood, Drug
Access, Patents and Global Health: 'Chaffed and Waxed Sufficient,' 23 THIRD WORLD Q.,217, 228
(2002).
27o. Drahos, supra note 2o8, at 207.
271. Geneva Declaration, supra note 130, at i.
272. Id.
273. New Enclosures: Alternative Mechanisms To Enhance Corporate Monopoly and BioSerfdom in the
21st Century, COMMUNIQUE (ETC Group, Winnipeg, Can.), Nov./Dec. 2001, at 2.
274. Convergence Panel, supra note 252, at 6.
275. See, e.g., DRAHOS & BRAITHwAiTE, supra note 201, at 11.
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intellectual property rights today, both in the United States and around the
world.276 Both the Geneva Declaration and the Adelphi Charter take pains to
indicate that they are not opposed to intellectual property per se and instead
frame their request as one for balance and increased competition. In so doing,
these documents draw on economic arguments about the dangers of IP that is
too strong or too far upstream in the innovation chain.277 The Geneva
Declaration urges WIPO to acknowledge "the importance of striking a balance
between the public domain and competition on the one hand, and the realm of
property rights on the other," and to "formally embrace the notions of balance,
appropriateness and the stimulation of both competitive and collaborative
models of creative activity. "278 The Adelphi Charter insists that "It]he public
interest requires a balance between the public domain and private rights" and
"between the free competition that is essential for economic vitality and the
monopoly rights granted by intellectual property laws. '279 In other words,
rather than rejecting IP outright or rejecting the economic framing of the field,
276. This justification contends that exclusive rights are required to induce the production of
information because information is (at least in ideal form) nonrival and nonexcludable. See
ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 12-18 (2d ed. 2000). There are other philosophical justifications
offered for IP, such as the Lockean account that treats IP as a reward for labor, see id. at 2-5,
and "personality" theory, which suggests that IP helps realize individual personhood or will,
see G.W.F. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 41-45 (T.M. Knox trans., 1967) (1821); Margaret
Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REv. 957 (1982). But perhaps because these
latter theories are today somewhat less influential in political and legal terms, see William
Fisher, Theories ofIntellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY
OF PROPERTY 168, 173 (Stephen Munzer ed., 2001), it is rare to find a direct challenge to or
reworking of these claims in the texts of the A.K mobilization. The one notable exception
comes from the traditional knowledge domain, which, as I suggested earlier, sits in an
uneasy relationship to the A2K mobilization as a whole.
277. Economists and legal scholars have long posited that exclusive rights in basic knowledge
inputs - facts, words, ideas, scientific principles, literary tropes, data, and so forth - have the
potential to create dynamic inefficiencies. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 93, 3o6 (2003); see also
Richard R. Nelson, The Simple Economics of Basic Scientific Research, 67 J. POL. ECON. 297,
302-04 (1959) (describing why firms often cannot capture the full value produced by basic
R&D). Scholars have also recently argued that broad and increasingly upstream patents may
create thickets or anticommons effects that could impede innovation. See, e.g., Michael A.
Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical
Research, 280 SCi. 698 (1998). For diverging views regarding whether research in the United
States has been affected by inability to quickly negotiate access to IP, compare Walsh et al.,
supra note 68, with STEPHEN HANSEN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF PATENTING IN THE AAAS
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY 21 (2005).
278. Geneva Declaration, supra note 130, at 1-2.
279. Adelphi Charter, supra note 138.
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A2K groups have become quite deeply engaged with arguments about
competition and monopoly and have actively embraced arguments about the
importance of a "balance" between public and private rights.
Just how deeply these groups have come to engage these arguments
becomes clear when one considers the kinds of policy proposals that A2K
groups suggest. The Adelphi Charter and Geneva Declaration insist that
"[c]reativity and investment should be recognised and rewarded " "28 and that
"creative individuals and communities" must be supported.281 They also
propose a series of alternatives to IP that could meet these aims. The Geneva
Declaration, for example, points to new "collaborative efforts to create public
goods, including the Internet, the World Wide Web, Wikipedia, the Creative
Commons, GNU Linux and other free and open software projects," and a
"renewed interest in compensatory liability rules, innovation prizes, or
competitive intermediators, as models for economic incentives for science and
technology that can facilitate sequential follow-on innovation and avoid
monopolist abuses. ' '2s2
Actors involved in the A2K mobilization are thus both embracing the
language of innovation and creativity, rather than, for example, rejecting
innovation in favor of access to informational resources, and engaging
substantively in questions about how information is best produced and how
innovation systems can be optimized to maximize social welfare. A2K actors are
seeking to refashion arguments about the economics of innovation from within
in at least two ways: by challenging the presumption embedded in IP law that
information is generally or most efficiently created by individuals who are
seeking to make a profit, and by arguing that the poor cannot adequately
manifest their demand in markets, so that a privatized innovation system will
not maximize true public welfare.
These arguments are foreshadowed in the declarations discussed above, but
a proper elaboration requires us to delve somewhat more substantively into the
arguments of participants in the A2K network. The production process of free
and open-source software is central to the imaginary of the A2K mobilization
because it offers a model of collaborative, distributed innovation that does not
280. Id. at 1.
z8i. Geneva Declaration, supra note 130, at 1. As the Web site that hosts the model Access to
Knowledge Treaty puts it, "While the [Access to Knowledge] movement is concerned about
fairness and access to knowledge, it also is supportive of creative and inventive
communities. To reconcile these interests, we promote new paradigms for the creation and
management of knowledge resources." See CPTech, Access to Knowledge, Overview,
http://www.cptech.org/a2k/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2007).
28z. Geneva Declaration, supra note 130, at 1.
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rely on the incentivizing effect of IP rights. Free software is created by
volunteers, and its collaborative model of production is sustained by the
General Public License (GPL) that governs it.283 The GPL gives users the right
to copy and modify the associated source code and requires that users apply the
same rights to any derivative works produced from the licensed software.284
Everyone who makes use of such software must therefore contribute any
improvements back into the common pool, and no one who makes incremental
improvements on the software can seek compensation for his or her labor
through strategies of exclusion. If the account embedded in IP law were
correct, such software should not exist. 
8s
The fact that it does exist leads participants in the A2K mobilization to
postulate that the traditional model of IP misses something fundamental about
the necessary conditions of creativity, particularly in the digital age. The
argument has been developed most centrally by Yochai Benkler. He contends
that the networked digital environment facilitates new forms of commons-
based peer production because it aggregates individuals at a scale that helps
overcome motivational and organizational challenges. 86 Perhaps the most
forceful articulation of this view is Eben Moglen's "Metaphorical Corollary to
Faraday's Law": "Wrap the Internet around every brain on the planet and spin
the planet. Software flows in the wires. It's an emergent property of human
minds to create.2 87
The arguments of farmers' rights advocates are strikingly similar. For
millennia, these advocates contend, farmers have refined and protected plant
varieties by sharing knowledge about them and by sharing seeds and cuttings
from local variations ("landraces").2 88 Each landrace may be a slightly different
species, and while landraces may produce lower yields on average than
283. See GNU Project, GNU General Public License (June 29, 2007), www.gnu.org/copyleft/
gpl.html.
284. See Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, The Scope of Open Source Licensing (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9363, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9363.
285. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 64, at 45.
286. Benkler, supra note 121; see also BENKLER, supra note 75; Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On
Shareable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic Production, 114 YALE
L.J. 273 (2004); see also Boyle, supra note 64, at 44-46; Eric Raymond, The Cathedral and the
Bazaar, FIRST MONDAY, Mar. 2, 1998, http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_3/
raymond/.
287. See Moglen, supra note 224, pt. III.
288. In developing countries, at least eighty percent of seed is obtained outside of the commercial
system. See Carlos M. Correa, Options for the Implementation of Farmers' Rights at the National
Level 14 (Istituto Agronomico per l'Oltremare [Overseas Agronomic Institute], Working
Paper No. 8, 2ooo).
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commercial monocultures, they are also more diverse and thus protect better
against catastrophic crop failure to which standardized monocrops may be
vulnerable.289 Local varieties may also be better adapted to local circumstances
than the monocultures sold by seed companies and will be the inputs for
bioprospecting in the short and long term.2 9° The agricultural stock that we
have today thus depends upon the historical efforts of farmers to cultivate and
preserve landraces. But plant breeders' rights and patents on genetically
modified plant materials cannot compensate for this past labor. The subject
matter of landraces is too minimally defined and variable, and landraces
typically evolve naturally over time, which can make it impossible to separate
out the contributions of different farmers.2  There is no clear titleholder for
germplasm produced in this way, and no formula for the optimal duration and
territorial validity of rights derived from the collective work of farmers. 9
Farmers' rights proponents and advocates of free software thus describe
systems of "innovation" that are inherently collective and that create
informational goods of significant value, but that cannot be protected by, and
indeed are harmed by, regimes of exclusive rights in information. Software
patents, many programmers contend, are incompatible with an open-source
model of software development. 93 And exclusive rights in germplasm,
especially when combined with seed laws that require certification and restrict
sharing practices, threaten to "undermine the free sharing of knowledge and
resources among local communities and the world community [and may
prove] incompatible with the collective nature of innovation at the community
level. '2 94 These arguments resonate with those made by advocates of
Wikipedia, open-source genomics, and even open-source drug development. 95
289. Borowiak, supra note 91, at 524.
290. Correa, supra note 288, at ii.
291. Id. at 3, 20.
292. Id. at 29-30.
293. See, e.g., RICHARD STALLmAN, The Danger of Software Patents, in FREE SOFTWARE, FREE
SocIETY 95 (Joshua Gay ed., 2002).
294. Correa, supra note 288, at 21. On seed laws, see, for example, Neils Louwaars, Biases and
Bottlenecks: Time To Reform the South's Inherited Seed Laws?, SEEDLING, July 2005, at 4,
available at http://www.grain.org/seedling-files/seed-o5-07-2.pdf.
295. See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Commons-Based Strategies and the Problems of Patents, 305 Sci. 1110
(2004) (discussing the application of peer-production models to science); Goetz, supra note
147, at 2o8, 21o-11 (discussing open-source genornics); Stephen M. Maurer, Arti Rai &
Andrej Sali, Finding Cures for Tropical Diseases: Is Open Source an Answer?, 1 PLoS MED. 183
(2004) (discussing open-source biomedical research).
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Taken together, these arguments are being used by A2K advocates to sketch
out a claim that creative potential inheres as much in the undivided group as in
the individual genius and can perhaps best be said to reside in the network that
connects people. Even the access-to-medicines campaign-which, recall,
Stallman characterized as being "just about price" - has a form of this claim. As
access-to-medicines advocates frequently note, it was Indian firms that first
incorporated all of the necessary anti-HIV drugs into one pill, thereby making
it easier for patients to adhere to treatment and prevent viral resistance.296
If the traditional IP paradigm idealizes a moment of creative departure
from what came before, the A2K mobilization idealizes the ground from which
creators depart and the rights that would-be-creators have to stand upon it.
The implication, ultimately, is that existing IP law is not welfare maximizing
because it fails to reward a great deal of innovation and because it puts
collaborative and "open-source" innovators at a comparative disadvantage.
A second form of internal critique that A2K participants are developing
argues that the incentives produced by exclusive rights in innovation do not, in
fact, correspond to social welfare, for example because most of the world's
people are too poor to adequately manifest their demand in the global market.
This critique can be seen in the argument about the "R&D gap" articulated by
access-to-medicines campaigners. Advocates argue that this gap exists because
"drug companies in developed and developing nations simply cannot recoup
the cost of R&D for products to treat diseases that abound in developing
countries. 97 Unsurprisingly, the global pharmaceutical market is highly
concentrated in wealthy countries. Low- and middle-income countries together
provide only about five to seven percent of the revenues of the U.S.-based
pharmaceutical industry, and of course, potential revenues are a significant
factor in firms' decisions to invest.29 8 As a recent blue ribbon commission of
academics, economists, and policymakers concluded, the ability of IP to
incentivize biomedical R&D in developing countries "may be limited or non-
existent" because "the market demand . .. is small and uncertain."2 99 Patents
z96. In the United States and Europe, every effective drug combination involves patents from
more than one company, and the first combination pill to enter that market did so only in
July 2006. Andrew Pollack, F.D.A. Backs AIDS Pill To Be Taken Once a Day, N.Y. TIMES,
July 13, 2006, at C3.
297. 't Hoen, supra note io, at 28-29.
298. I have made this point in more detail with colleagues in a recent article. See Kapczynski et
al., supra note 24o, at 1051-52.
z99. Tomris Tiirmen & Charles Clift, Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property Rights:
Unfinished Business, 84 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORG. 338, 338 (2006) (describing the
conclusions of the CIPR report, supra note 84).
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and private markets in innovation generally drive innovation toward areas of
highest potential profit. Because wealth is highly unequally distributed around
the world, advocates contend, a patent-based medical R&D system will
systematically fail to produce products in proportion to medical need. It will
instead drive innovation toward areas of greatest return to firms, and thus will
maximize private value rather than social value.
The same point is made by A2K advocates in relation to the public
domain. 3°' They contend that markets fail to register properly not only
demand that is not made manifest with dollars, but also value that cannot be
privately appropriated. This, then, represents another way that A2K advocates
are seeking to refashion the arguments about innovation systems that
legitimize the global IP system: they contend that exclusive rights regimes will
not maximize social welfare because they prioritize private over social value.
A2K advocates are also proposing strategies to sustain the kind of
innovation that they value, outside or alongside the IP system. For example,
many A.K groups have developed and promoted private ordering strategies
designed to change individuals' practices in relation to IP rather than the law of
IP itself.301 Free software, of course, is just such an effort. It is a private
ordering system designed to foster innovation within traditional IP regimes by
creating mechanisms and norms to facilitate collaboration and sharing among
private individuals. The GPL, of course, has been used as a model for a myriad
of other private ordering schemes, such as Creative Commons licenses, open
genomics licenses, and licenses to promote access to public sector research.
30 2
The access-to-medicines campaign has evolved into a critique of the global
pharmaceutical R&D system and a set of proposed solutions that involve not
just the right to override patents, but also new systems to incentivize
innovation that will better serve the world's poor. A2K groups, for example,
recently proposed a new framework convention for medical R&D, which
would require equitable global investment in medical R&D and at the same
time address some of the criticisms that the movement has developed about
patent-based medical R&D. 3 3 All of these are symptoms of the discursive effect
that engagement with law has had upon A2K actors.
300. See, e.g., RUFUS POLLOCK, THE VALUE OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 3-4 (2006).
301. Niva Elkin-Koren, What Contracts Cannot Do: The Limits of Private Ordering in Facilitating a
Creative Commons, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 375, 376 (2005).
302. See Kapczynski et al., supra note 24o, at 1o69-72; supra text accompanying notes 144-147.
303. See Medical Research and Development Treaty (MRDT) arts. 4, 7 (Feb. 7, 2005) (draft),
http://www.cptech.org/workingdrafts/rndtreaty4.pdf; see also Nicoletta Dentico & Nathan
Ford, The Courage To Change the Rules: A Proposal for an Essential Health R&D Treaty, 2
PLoS MED. 0096 (2005).
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3. Strategic Effects
We can also see in the A2K mobilization evidence of a third kind of effect
that law has on framing processes. This "strategic" effect leads groups to
modulate their claims in narrow fashion in order to gain control over the
instrumental power of law. The difference between strategic and discursive
effects, as I intend the terms, turns on the depth of engagement with the
argument in question, not on the degree to which the argument is internalized
by movement participants.
Two examples will illustrate. Copyright law generally permits limited
copying under the defense of "fair use" or "fair dealing." The defense can
accommodate a range of different kinds of copying, from rote reproduction for
educational use to "transformative" uses such as works of parody. Some
influential members of the copyleft community make the case that everyday,
rote copying is just as important to creativity as is transformative copying.3" 4
The value of plain copying is particularly high for those who have no other
means to access a particular work-as is undoubtedly the case for many
purchasers of unauthorized copies in developing countries. And yet, when
copyleftists seek to mobilize sentiment against the encroachments of copyright
and argue for broader fair use provisions, they almost uniformly call upon the
figure of the parodist or transformative creator, rather than the teacher who
creates a coursepack for her students."' Why? One possibility is the strategic
effect that legal discourse has on acts of framing. Transformative uses may
appear more legitimate than other forms of copying, particularly in countries,
such as the United States, that have strong free speech traditions. They may
also be easier to defend as a legal matter. 6 Both dynamics would be produced
by a strategic calculation, and yet could have significant long-term effects. As
304. See Lawrence Liang & Achal Prabhala, Reconsidering the Pirate Nation, INFOCHANGE, Nov.
2006, http://www.infochangeindia.org/IPR articlel4.jsp. For an extended argument about
the importance of rote copying to free speech, see Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How
Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 546 (2004).
3os. Lawrence Lessig, for example, sometimes treats transformative copying as presumptively
fair, and nontransformative copying as presumptively unfair. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 115,
at 85-94. Boyle and Benkler both cite the Wind Done Gone facts (wherein the estate of
Margaret Mitchell sought to enjoin the publication of a retelling of Gone with the Wind
written from the perspective of a slave) as the paradigmatic violation of fair use rights. See
Benkler, supra note 165, at 173; Boyle, supra note 64, at 56; see also Suntrust Bank v.
Houghton Mifflin Co. (Wind Done Gone), 268 F. 3d 1257 (iith Cir. 2001).
306. Rebecca Tushnet argues, for example, that fair use law in the United States has become
"realigned around transformative use," Tushnet, supra note 304, at 55, which would make
such arguments more likely to succeed in court.
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Rebecca Tushnet notes, when advocates cite transformative uses and parodies
as the paradigmatic examples of fair use, they implicitly downgrade the status
of pure copying under fair use doctrine." 7 They may therefore unwittingly be
contributing to the drift of fair use law toward transformative copying and
away from the kind of rote copying that some copyleftists argue is more
important.
A second example can be drawn from recent advocacy around the Indian
Patent Act., 8 In order to comply with TRIPS, India had to introduce product
patents on medicines in early 2005.309 It previously had no such patents and
had become the world's largest producer of generic medicines by volume. 310
Concerned about the impact of this new patent law on patients around the
world, access-to-medicines groups lobbied the government heavily. They did
not urge the government to flout TRIPS, but instead insisted that it make use
of TRIPS flexibilities, for example, by adopting a very narrow definition of
patentable subject material.31'
The government adopted such a standard,312 and today these same activists
are engaged in pregrant patent oppositions, rather than opposition to patents
in India. This is so even though all of them would likely prefer that India were
entirely free of product patents on medicines. Despite their clearly stated view
that "[t]he implementation of the TRIPS agreement will have a negative effect
on the developing world's capacity to manufacture affordable generic drugs,
and will lead to an increase in drug prices," 313 none of the groups central to the
307. Id. at 558.
308. See The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, No. 15, Acts of Parliament, 2005.
309. With the 1970 Patent Act, the Indian government did away with patents on medicines in an
effort to become self-sufficient in the pharmaceutical sector and provide Indian consumers
with increased access to affordable medicines. See Shubham Chaudhuri, Pinelopi K.
Goldberg & Panle Jia, Estimating the Effects of Global Patent Protection in Pharmaceuticals: A
Case Study of Quinolones in India 6-7 (BREAD, Working Paper No. 125, 20o6), available at
http://www.cid.harvard.edu/bread/papers/working/125.pdf; see also Frederick M. Abbott,
The WTO Medicines Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health,
99 AM. J. INT'L L. 317, 320 (2005).
310. See Chaudhuri et al., supra note 309, at 3.
311. See, e.g., MEDECINS SANS FRONTItRES [DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS], WILL THE LIFELINE
OF AFFORDABLE MEDICINES FOR POOR COUNTRIES BE CUT? CONSEQUENCES OF MEDICINES
PATENTING IN INDIA 4-6 (2005), available at http://www.msf.fr/documents/base/2o0s-02-
oi-msf.pdf.
312. See, e.g., The Patents (Amendment) Act, 2005, § 3 (d) (precluding patents on new uses of
known substances and limiting patents on new forms of known substances).
313. MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES [DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS], EMERGENCY PRESCRIPTIONS:
STRATEGIES FOR INCREASING ACCESS TO MEDICINES FOR INFECTIOUS DISEASES (2000).
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medicines campaign have publicly campaigned against TRIPS as such. They
argue instead that countries should not go beyond what TRIPS requires and
should make maximal use of TRIPS exceptions-even as they express doubt
that these exceptions are in fact workable for poor countries. 14 My own
experience in this campaign verifies this disconnect: although many of the key
advocates in the field seem to believe that IP does not belong in the trade
regime, they are paradoxically far less likely to make this claim than are
mainstream economists and academics unconnected with the movement."I
B. The Implications of Law's Gravitational Pull
The preceding pages describe several types of effects that law may have on
framing processes. It is of course difficult to know how deeply engagement
with law will affect the A2K mobilization, in part because there is as yet no
single place to go to ascertain the self-conception and strategies of this new set
of political actors. But that is also part of the point. Movements that organize
around and through law do not preexist that law-instead, they are constituted
through it. And the process of engaging with law no doubt generates feedback
effects that alter the internal dynamics of these movements. As groups begin to
succeed in changing law, for example, these successes may promote some
strands of the movement over others. To the extent that less disruptive reform
efforts are likely to have more success, they may begin to take center stage in
the movement. This is yet another way to understand law as a constitutive
force in the dynamics of political mobilization.
Organizing around law has helped not only to galvanize the A2K
mobilization, but also to shape its language and self-construction. This is
evident in the architecture of the mobilization, in the investment of A2K actors
in arguments and strategies that operate internal to the logic of the law and
legal discourse of IP, and in the tendency of movement actors strategically to
modulate their claims by, for example, embracing TRIPS flexibilities rather
than opposing TRIPS. These are effects of what I call the gravitational pull that
law exerts on framing processes. What are the implications of these effects?
One implication, as Reva Siegel points out, is that
movement/countermovement struggle can "strengthen law precisely as it
314. See MEtDECINS SANs FRONTItRES [DOCTORS WITHOUT BORDERS], NEITHER EXPEDITIOUS,
NORA SOLUTION: THE WTO AUGUST 30TH DECISION IS UNWORKABLE (2006).
315. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Aftenvord: The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 127
(2002).
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unsettles it. ' '316 Siegel's point is that because (or where) law is open to
contestation, groups seeking to capture its instrumental and legitimizing power
may be drawn to legal institutions and discourse, and thus drawn to speak in
the same language as their opponents and at the same time to make claims
upon - and implicitly defer to - existing legal institutions.
This can strengthen law in two ways. First, it can create zones of
overlapping consensus in which judges can decide cases and law can be seen as
legitimate despite sharp contestation. Siegel offers an example of this dynamic
drawn from the history of the Equal Rights Amendment: in their struggle for
control over constitutional discourse, proponents of the ERA publicly
disavowed expansive applications of the amendment that they privately
favored, and leading opponents of the ERA argued that a constitutional
amendment was unnecessary because the Fourteenth Amendment already
protected women's equality.317 Second, movement/countermovement conflict
can strengthen law by producing identification with legal terms. The latter may
occur, for example, when groups embrace a constitutional principle and seek to
redeem it before a court. But it may also happen when groups seek to use
nonconstitutional legal tools as well. For example, Creative Commons has been
criticized as implicitly promoting the conceptual framework of copyright law
because "the only practice [it] persistently promotes is letting individuals
govern their works."3, 8 The GPL, of course, also necessarily relies on copyright
law for its effects, and it is now frequently pointed out that in this sense, its
licensing scheme depends upon copyright law.
31 9
The A2K mobilization offers another, perhaps more paradoxical,
mechanism by which movement/countermovement mobilizations may
strengthen law even as they unsettle it. When A2K advocates draw attention to
the restrictive nature of IP law to recruit support for their cause, they may
radicalize their intended audience. But they may at the same time introduce IP
concepts to potential constituents who would otherwise be unaware of them.
Many academic scientists in the United States today, for example, operate with
studied disregard for the patent status of the research tools that they use.3"'
316. Siegel, supra note 60, at 1419.
317. Id. at 1381-1414.
318. See Elkin-Koren, supra note 301, at 400-01.
319. See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 88, at to. This fact not only has potential effects on framing; it
also creates legal quandaries. See Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Cultural Environmentalism
and the Constructed Commons, LAW & CONTEmp. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 23.
320. See, e.g., John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora & Wesley M. Cohen, Effect of Research Tools Patents
and Licensing on Biomedical Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285,
327 (Wesley M. Cohen & Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003); Walsh et al., supra note 68, at 2002.
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One such scientist recently told a researcher that such patents were "not a
problem. I know this is a murky legal issue, and you should talk to patent
lawyers, but in everyday practice, it is not murky. There is a concept of
'academic use' . . . . I don't know if it is solidly defensible in the law, but it is
the practice. "
321
Paradoxically, it may be advocates of a broader research exemption who
draw attention to this conduct and introduce to the academic research
community a sense that they are behaving illegally, particularly because such
scientists are rarely sued.3 22 Similarly, many netizens may learn first from
copyleftists that their everyday activities (select-all, copy, paste) may violate
copyright law. The tutelary effect of the legalism of the AK mobilization may
be particularly important if, as some scholars have suggested, IP law frequently
conflicts with everyday practices and behaviors. 23 But this dynamic may also
be one that operates more broadly. Those who seek popularly to contest law
must first explain it to their constituents. They may even be led to aggrandize
the effects of the law that they seek to change, once again with potentially
paradoxical implications from the perspective of these same advocates.
The account of law's gravitational effects offered here.thus suggests that
groups that engage in attempts to change law may be drawn into legal
discourses, and into more agreement with their opponents than they might
wish. I do not presume here that movement actors should resist the
gravitational pull of law or that the benefits are invariably outweighed by the
costs. The conceptual paradigm that underpins framing theory does suggest,
though, that discourses carry with them particular affordances and constraints.
It also indicates that groups can and do manipulate these effects to some
degree. But law is a particularly weighty source of frames, and if groups find
themselves wanting to resist its pull, framing theory suggests several strategies
that might help.
A2K groups, for example, might consciously cultivate alternative collective-
action frames. The mobilization might, for example, theorize its connections as
based not on IP law but on other axes that might unite its members, such as a
"neo-Jeffersonian" ideology that privileges smallholders and distributed
321. Walsh et al., supra note 320, at 327.
322. See id.; see also supra note 68.
323. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for File-
Sharing, 12 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2004); Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of
Copyright: The Challenges of Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV.
1343, 1345-46 (1989).
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networks over large businesses and hierarchical modalities of production.3 4 If
A2K actors attend to the pull that law exerts on their discourse and strategies
and the path-dependent chains of argument that their interpretive choices
establish, they can seek to act against them. They might respond to the
example of parody and fair use offered above, for example, by making rote
copying more central to their fair use claims. Similarly, information economics
is of course not the only frame in which to contest IP law, and A2K actors
might actively cultivate alternative languages for making their claims."'
Discourses that might be mined for such purposes can be readily found in the
writings of the movement and its academic proponents.26 Of course, to adopt
different discourses and strategies in this way might mean relinquishing some
of the short-term and instrumental value of engagement with legal discourse.
But to the extent that groups are aware of framing processes, they are likely to
be better situated to make such judgments.
Given space constraints, in the remaining pages I will focus on a third
implication, one that the A2K mobilization is particularly suited to help us
think about. As Siegel points out, if law and legal discourse are sufficiently
open to competing groups, and if control over legal language is sufficiently
appealing in instrumental or normative terms, groups may well find
themselves speaking in the same terms, as they each struggle to embed their
claims in law and counter one another's claims. This may mean, as Siegel's
example of the ERA demonstrates, that groups come to outwardly voice
agreement upon certain things, such as the fact that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to women as a protected class.
But law can also create a different kind of integration -an integration of
disagreement. Disagreement here means something specific:
324. See Daniel A. Farber, Conflicting Visions and Contested Baselines: Intellectual Property and Free
Speech in the "Digital Millennium," 89 MINN. L. REV. 1318, 1319, 1325-35 (2005).
325. See Drahos, supra note 204, at 15.
326. See, e.g., 3D, POLICY BRIEF ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, DEVELOPMENT AND HUMAN RIGHTS:
How HUMAN RIGHTS CAN SUPPORT PROPOSALS FOR A WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
ORGANIZATION (WIPO) DEVELOPMENT AGENDA (20o6), http://www.3dthree.org/pdf.3D/
3DPolBrief-WIPO-eng.pdf (human rights); Frederick M. Abbott, TRIPS and Human
Rights: Preliminary Reflections, in INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 145 (Frederick
M. Abbott, Christine Breining-Kaufmann & Thomas Cotrier eds., 2006) (same); Rosemary
J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics: Intellectual Property Laws and Democratic
Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853, 1877-79 (1991) ("dialogism"); see also LESSIG, supra note 115
(free speech); Benkler, supra note 165 (same); Rosemary J. Coombe & Andrew Herman,
Rhetorical Virtues: Property, Speech, and the Commons on the World-Wide Web, 77
ANTHROPOLOGICAL Q. 559, 566 (2004) (cultural autonomy); William W. Fisher III, Property
and Contract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1217-18 (1998) ("semiotic
democracy").
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[A] determined kind of speech situation: one in which one of the
interlocutors at once understands and does not understand what the
other is saying. Disagreement is not the conflict between one who says
white and another who says black. It is the conflict between One who
says white and another who also says white but does not understand
the same thing by it .... *327
True disagreement (as opposed, say, to misunderstanding) thus occurs where
"[t]he interlocutors both understand and do not understand the same thing by
the same words."32' Integration thus does not necessarily imply agreement; it
also implies communities of disagreement. Such communities are what some
philosophers would argue constitute the public and political spheres. Hannah
Arendt, for example, argues that the "public" is a place that is "common to all
of us," where we can see and be seen by others.32 9 The common world of the
public is thus "not guaranteed primarily by the 'common nature' of all men
who constitute it, but rather by the fact that, differences of position and the
resulting variety of perspectives notwithstanding, everybody is always
concerned with the same object."330 The polis, in turn, is a space where things
are "decided through words and persuasion and not through force and
violence," and where there can be no "uncontested rule."33'
One critical question in contemporary debates about globalization regards
the degree to which coalitions, political identifications, and publics can be built
across national boundaries and among geographically dispersed
communities.332 Although there is robust scholarly debate over the degree to
which globalization is undermining the traditional authority of the sovereign
state, there is broad agreement that the boundaries of the nation-state have
become more porous and our world increasingly networked.33  This then poses
327. RANCIRE, supra note 4, at x.
328. Id. at xi.
329. HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 50-52 (2d ed. 1958).
330. Id. at 57-58.
331. Id. at 26, 28.
332. See KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 2, at 33 ("We lack convincing studies of the sustained and
specific processes through which individuals and organizations create (or resist the creation
of) something resembling global civil society.").
333. See, e.g., CASTELLS, supra note 148, at 135-47; ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSEQUENCES OF
MODERNITY 63-65 (1990); JURGEN HABERMAS, THE INCLUSION OF THE OTHER lO6-07
(Ciaran Cronin & Pablo De Greiff eds., Ciaran Cronin trans., 1998). As JUrgen Habermas
characterizes the dilemma that ensues, processes of globalization
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a "troubling question of whether democratic opinion- and will-formation could
ever achieve a binding force that extends beyond the level of the nation-
state."334 Where, to adopt Arendt's terms, might we find the "common objects"
of dispute and the language in which to disagree beyond the borders of the
nation state? Increasingly, the answer may be in forms of international and
transnational law.
We thus arrive at possibly the most intriguing implication of the
gravitational pull that law can exert on framing processes. A2K groups and
their opponents are, as indicated above, struggling for control over common
terms, such as those related to innovation, the importance of medicines in poor
countries, and the implications of the digital age for processes of creative
production. The emergence of this new global political discourse of IP should
be of particular interest, because scholars of transnational mobilization suggest
that it is unlikely for mobilization to occur around issues as arcane and
technical as IP law.33 One implication of the story of the A2K mobilization,
then, is that international law and international legal institutions, even those
associated with prototypically "private" law, may have a key role to play in
building global publics. Law may help to create publics or polities by creating
places where people may come to build coalitions, develop areas of consensus,
and forge areas of common disagreement. If this is so, then decisions about the
shape of law and legal institutions can very likely help or hinder the creation of
such publics.
Again, a caveat: to say that law may be central to the creation of publics and
polities is not to suggest that law provides an even playing field, or that the
publics and polities it helps to create are not affected by forms of historical
give rise to two opposed tendencies. On the one hand they promote the expansion
of actors' consciousness, on the other the differentiation, extension, and
interconnection of systems, networks (such as markets), or organizations.
Whereas the growth of systems and networks multiplies possible contacts and
exchanges of information, it does not lead per se to the expansion of an
intersubjectively shared world and to the discursive interweaving of conceptions
of relevance, themes, and contributions from which political public spheres
arise.... For the present it remains unclear whether an expanding public
consciousness, though centered in the lifeworld, nevertheless has the ability to
span systematically differentiated contexts ....
HABERMAS, supra, at 120-21.
334. HABERMAS, supra note 333, at 127.
335. Keck and Sikkink suggest that because "[n]etworks are difficult to organize
transnationally," they "have emerged around a particular set of issues with high value
content and transcultural resonance." KECK & SIKKINK, supra note 2, at 200. "Intellectual
property" would not seem to have met either criterion prior to the A2K mobilization.
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privilege and disadvantage. The concept of the public sphere sometimes carries
such implications, but it need not. 6 Other questions also remain about the
exact nature of the commonalities and disagreements that can be built across
borders through engagement with international law and legal institutions.
Under what conditions might such communities emerge? Can they be of
sufficient durability and depth to demand and enforce accountability at the
supranational level? Under what conditions might conflict over legal orders at
the international level engender strong and normatively engaged publics, and
under what conditions fragmented and volatile publics?
To these questions we must add the more general question of when,
whether, and how much law will matter to the framing processes of particular
groups. One factor might be the degree to which groups understand
themselves to be authorized to make claims upon, or offer reinterpretations of,
a particular law or form of law.337 Another might be the purchase that a
particular law has in a given circumstance or legal system. The gravitational
pull of different forms of law, that is, might also respond to the relative force of
that law within a particular legal order or problem. Audience is also likely to
matter a great deal; law may hold tremendous authority in some circles and be
viewed as irrelevant or suspect in others. A fourth factor might be the degree to
which the terms of a particular law are "elaborated" or "restricted. 3, 8
Restricted terms, as they are defined in linguistics and framing theory, are
highly particularized, predictable, and rigidly organized; they "provide a
constricted range of definitions, thus allowing for little interpretive
discretion."339 They may thus be less attractive for groups seeking to mobilize
than elaborated terms, which are more flexible and universalistic and "allow for
336. See generally Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of
Actually Existing Democracy, in THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE 1 (Bruce Robbins ed., 1993);
Bruce Robbins, Introduction: The Public as Phantom, in THE PHANTOM PUBLIC SPHERE, supra,
at vii-viii.
337. Siegel suggests that U.S. constitutional law has a special attraction for those engaged in
social movements in the United States today because "mobilized groups of citizens
understand themselves as authorized to speak to matters involving 'what is officially the
law/legal system' where the Constitution is concerned, in a way that they do not feel
authorized to speak about questions of tort or property law." Siegel, supra note 54, at 322.
But as Siegel implies, the degree to which individuals feel authorized to speak to the
meaning of a law is likely to vary with context. And even today, while constitutional law
may imply a special relationship of authorship by "We the People," all forms of law in the
United States, even tort and property law, are commonly understood to derive from the
authority of the people, and all laws are officially open to revision by these same people.
338. Snow & Benford, supra note 23, at 139-40.
339. Id. at 140.
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extensive ideational amplification and extension."340 This notion fits with the
suggestions of some law-and-social-movement scholars that constitutional
discourse and rights discourse are particularly attractive to movements because
they operate through the application of open textured principles. 34 '
Studying the A2K mobilization and the industry mobilization that preceded
it using a dialogic frame-analytic perspective thus permits us not only to
develop appropriately complex accounts of the new politics of IP, but also to
begin to theorize the relationship between law and framing processes, and
between law and the emergence of publics and polities beyond the nation-state.
CONCLUSION
In the last several decades, intellectual property law has become
significantly stronger, both in the United States and around the world.
Recently, a powerful backlash has emerged and begun to gather loosely under
the rubric of "access to knowledge." The dominant explanation for the
expansion of IP law cannot, by itself, account for the emergence and initial
successes of the countermovement-or indeed, the mobilization of the IP
industries that preceded it. This Article argues that frame-analytic accounts
developed in the field of sociology can provide a fuller and less deterministic
account of the new politics of IP, by elucidating the way that socially mediated
acts of interpretation have influenced collective action in both the IP industries
and the A2K mobilization.
Using framing theory, we can see how the recent expansion of IP law
responded not just to material interests, but also to acts of framing that allowed
IP advocates to interpret their interests, build alliances, and persuade others to
support their cause. The A2K mobilization was made possible by similar acts of
framing, which have permitted those involved-who come from diverse
contexts and who initially organized around divergent frameworks -to build
340. Id.
341. See, e.g., Balkin & Siegel, supra note 54, at 928 ("[W]hen advocates apply constitutional
principles in new ways, they can create conflicts between longstanding principles and
longstanding practices so that one customary understanding calls into question the other.");
William E. Forbath, Why Is This Rights Talk Different from All Other Rights Talk? Demoting
the Court and Reimagining the Constitution, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1771, 18o 5 (1994) (book review)
("People mobilize around rights, not human capital policy. Every previous generation of
reformers addressed its task in the language of citizenship and rights, as well as of budgets
and policies. We have learned to be leery of high-sounding rights talk; we have not learned
to do without it."); Siegel, supra note 6o, at 1323 (referring to the "open-textured language
of the Constitution's rights guarantees").
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new concepts joining them together, concepts such as the "public domain," the
"commons," the importance of "sharing," and the value of "access to
knowledge." The acts of framing that have characterized this mobilization-
many of which were directly facilitated or influenced by law-have allowed
A2K groups to understand their interests as related, forge coalitions, and
recruit support in areas where popular political categories and claims
previously did not exist. The frame-analytic perspective thus helps us to
develop a rich account of the new politics of IP and of the way that the A2K
mobilization and IP industries have coevolved in the shadow of law.
What, ultimately, can we learn from the A2K mobilization, and from the
social-movement methodology that this Article adopts? First, the field of IP is
influenced - perhaps especially today - not only by changes in economics and
technology, but also by social actors and the arguments that these actors use to
build alliances and persuade others. A frame-mobilization perspective allows us
to see how groups use frames to interpret their interests, to recruit allies, and to
convince others of the justness of their cause -and thus how an IP industry
coalition that once looked all-powerful is fraying, and why a countermovement
that once seemed impossible now appears to be emerging.
Other scholars have recognized the importance of ideas to the field of IP,
and I have relied on their work here. My contribution is not to introduce this
notion, but to situate it within a theory of the role of interpretation in collective
action. Framing theory permits us to systematize and extend the insight that
ideas matter to IP law, and to relate this to existing public choice accounts of
the politics of IP. Systematically incorporating the role of interpretation into
accounts of political economy should make us significantly less confident of
our ability to predict political outcomes using fixed assumptions about
interests and how a group's interests can best be advanced. This may be
particularly true in times of environmental uncertainty and ideational flux.
By drawing on the synergistic developments in framing theory and law-
and-social-movements theory, both of which have recently begun to address
the role of law in framing processes, we can also understand key aspects of the
evolution of the A2K mobilization. Studying that mobilization allows us to
develop further theories of how and why law affects framing processes. As A2K
activists have come up against legal constraints and looked to law to
understand and change their circumstances, they have been offered new
understandings of their interests and claims. As A2K groups seek to coalesce
through an architectural framework provided by law and to embed their own
interests in that law, they are developing a range of proposals to reform IP law
and arguments that operate within the discourse that governs contemporary
discussions about IP. That is, organizing around law has helped not only to
galvanize this movement, but also to shape its language and self-construction.
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A2K groups are, for example, developing critiques internal to the economic
logic most commonly used to justify IP law, challenging the notion that
information is most efficiently produced by individuals seeking to make a
profit, and arguing that privatized innovation systems prioritize private over
social welfare.
These effects demonstrate what I call the gravitational pull of law. This
term encompasses both law's power as a "master frame" and the fact that legal
discourses are constitutively constrained. This force not only can affect a
group's architecture, discourse, and strategies; it can also lead groups into
zones of agreement, and of common disagreement, with their opponents.
The final aim of this Article has been to begin to explore several
implications of law's gravitational pull on framing processes. First, law's
integrative effect may be of interest to those who design legal systems because
it suggests that law can be strengthened, and not only unsettled, by
mobilizations and countermobilizations. Second, it may be of interest to those
engaged in social mobilization, because understanding these effects may be
important to determining how to engage and possibly exert more control over
them. Third, and perhaps most intriguingly, it may be of interest to those
concerned with whether and how we can build publics and polities that reach
beyond the borders of the nation-state. International and transnational law
can, that is, offer competing groups a common language in which to speak, and
a common table around which to gather. Law may therefore form a medium
through which international publics and polities may emerge. Analyzing the
A.K mobilization thus not only tells us something about the new politics of IP;
it can also help us begin to theorize the relationship between law and the
creation of global publics and polities.
If we take seriously the role of interpretation in collective action, we
discover that law can have important effects on the framing processes of social
actors. These insights open up fertile new ground for scholarship, particularly
in the domain of international and transnational law. But they are also
important to our ability to describe and understand the new politics of IP,
which is emerging around us as we speak.
